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ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE AS A BRIDGE OVER THE TROUBLED WATERS OF 
COPYRIGHT FAIR USE -- FROM JEFFERSON TO MANDELA TO GOOGLE1
Douglas L. Rogers* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Jefferson wrote, "That ideas should freely spread from one to 
another over the globe, for the moral instruction of man, seems to have been peculiarly 
and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over 
all space …."2 Yet access to the literary works generated from the ideas envisioned by 
Jefferson have not spread equally throughout the United States or the world.3 Nelson 
Mandela said, "Eliminating the distinction between the information–rich and information–
poor is also critical to eliminating economic and other inequalities between North and 
 
* Doug Rogers is a partner with Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP in Columbus, Ohio.  The 
views expressed in this article are the views of Doug Rogers and do not reflect any position of the firm. 
1 "Bridge Over Troubled Water" is a song copyrighted by Paul Simon.  Access to knowledge is a 
concern of both academics and the courts.  The "Yale Access to Knowledge (A2K) Initiative aims to build 
an intellectual framework that will protect access to knowledge both as the basis for sustainable human 
development and to safeguard human rights."  See 
http://research.yale.edu/isp/projects.html?pagelink=knowledge, visited 8/12/06.   The Eleventh Circuit has 
said the "Copyright Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides an economic incentive 
for authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the public."  Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001). 
2 1813 letter of Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson.  See http://www.red-
bean.com/kfogel/jefferson-macpherson-letter.html, visited 5/26/2006; and J. Boyle, "The Second 
Enclosure Movement And The Construction Of The Public Domain" (hereafter "Second Enclosure 
Movement"), 66 Law & Contemp. Probls. 33, 53 (Winter/Spring 2003).  Jefferson was referring in this 
letter to patents, but the same principal would naturally apply to the expression of ideas in copyrighted 
works. 
3 See, eg., T. Bissell, "The Digital Divide Dilemma: Preserving Native American Culture While 
Increasing Access to Information Technology on Reservations," 2004 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 129 (Spring 
2004); A. Hammond, "The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 135 
(Symposium – Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age) (2002); C. Darch, "Digital 
Divide or Unequal Exchange?  How the Northern Intellectual Property Rights Regime Threatens the 
South," 32 Int'l J. Legal Info. 488 (Summer 2004); M. Garlick, "Locking Up the Bridge in the Digital Divide 
– A consideration of the Impact of the U.S. Anti-Circumvention Measures for the Participation of 
Developing Countries in the Digital Economy," 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 941 (May 
2004); and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "The Digital Divide Report: ICT 
Diffusion Index 2005" (New York and Geneva, 2006) p. iii ("Regardless of how we measure it, there is an 
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South, and to improving the life of all humanity."4 This article takes the position that 
applying copyright fair use to promote access to knowledge is one small but important 
step to eliminating the distinction between the information-rich (and not coincidentally 
materially rich) and the information-poor (and not coincidentally materially poor).5
The U.S. Constitution reflects the goal of which Mandela spoke -- 
benefiting humanity -- by authorizing Congress to grant authors and inventors exclusive 
rights to control works they create in order "to promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts."6 The word "access" does not appear in that authorizing clause, but there 
can be no promotion of science or the useful arts without access to literary works.7 As 
 
immense information and communication technology (ICT) gap, a 'digital divide,' between developed and 
developing countries"). 
4 E. Wilson, III, The Information Revolution and Developing Countries, p. 1, quoting Nelson 
Mandela  (MIT Press 2004) (hereafter "Information Revolution"). 
5 In discussing the tension in copyright law between providing effective incentives to create 
copyrighted works and not harming public access to such works, Okediji said the "fair use doctrine is an 
important bridge across this divide."  R.Okediji, "Givers, Takers, And Other Kinds Of Users:  A Fair Use 
Doctrine For Cyberspace," 53 Florida L. Rev. 107, 153 (January 2001) (hereafter "Givers, Takers").  
6 Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides, "The Congress shall have Power 
…. To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."  
7 See L. R. Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use," 40 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1, 7 (Jan. 
1987) (hereafter "Free Speech") ("Learning requires access to the work in which the ideas to be learned 
are embodied").  Of course presumably a person who creates a literary work advances his knowledge of 
useful arts and/or science by creating the work, but without any distribution, the advancement of science 
and the useful arts is very small in the context of the billions on people living on this planet.  Contrary to 
what now might be the ordinary interpretation of the words, there is authority for the proposition that 
"science" refers to general knowledge and that "useful arts" refers to inventions subject to patents.  See 
M. Nimmer and D. Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright §1.03[A], n.11.2 pp. 1-90-91 (hereafter "Nimmer on 
Copyright"); and O.G. Hatch and T.R. Les, "'To Promote The Progress Of Science': The Copyright Clause 
and Congress's Power To Extend Copyrights," 16 Harvard Journal Of Law & Technology 1, 7-8 (Fall 
2002), citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).  In Graham, the Supreme 
Court indicated that the issuance of patents was "limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts'," 
implying that promoting science was the authority for copyright legislation.  Id. at 5.  However, in Quality 
King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998), the Court said that the 
principal purpose of the copyright statutes "was to promote the progress of the useful Arts.'"  To the 
extent that "useful arts" instead of science is the authority for copyright legislation, courts have interpreted 
those words so that "useful has no meaningful operative effect."  1 Nimmer on Copyright §1.03[B], p. 1-
92. 
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the Supreme Court said in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., "copyright law ultimately serves the 
purpose of enriching the general public through access."8
Reflecting a balance between control of works by authors and access to 
works by third parties, the U.S. statutory copyright scheme has never given authors the 
right to control all uses of their copyrighted works, but instead gives protection to certain 
uses of original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression.9
Specifically, authors of protected works have six rights, including the right to control 
reproduction (copying) of their works, create derivative works and distribute their 
works.10 Although denominated exclusive, the six rights do not prevent a purchaser of a 
book from reading that book multiple times.11 Also, copyright law does not prevent 
 
8 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).  The Court added that because of that purpose of "enriching the 
general public through access" to literary works, "it is particularly important that the boundaries of 
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible."  Id. The holding in Fogerty was that prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants must be treated the same in evaluating whether to award attorney's fees in 
copyright infringement claims, and that an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party was up to the 
discretion of the court.  Id. at 534. 
9 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (In applying 
the Copyright Act of 1976, the Court said copyright "protection has never accorded the copyright owner 
complete control over all possible uses of his work"); and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-394 (1968) (discussing the Copyright Act of 1909).  17 U.S.C. §102(a) provides 
the statutory foundational requirement for any copyright protection:  "[c]opyright protection subsists, in 
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 
10 17 U.S.C. §106 provides: "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) 
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; 
and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission."  17 U.S.C. §106A provides additional rights for certain works of visual art that are 
limited to 200 or fewer copies.   See definition of "work of visual art" in 17 U.S.C. §101. 
11 Similarly, if someone buys a book, the purchaser can subsequently sell, give or loan that book to 
any other person, without asking for the permission of the publisher.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §109(a):  
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someone from copying ideas or facts reflected in a work.12 Most importantly for this 
article, copyright law does not prevent others from making "fair use" of copyrighted 
works.13 
Fair use is "one of those intricate and embarrassing questions … in which 
it is not … easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general 
principles applicable to all cases."14 Jumping into this fair use abyss is significant 
litigation (the “Google Litigation”) involving Google's project to scan the books from 
major university libraries in the United States and England into a huge on-line database 
(the “Google Database”) from which users can search for books containing words of 
interest to the user and view "snippets" with those words from the books, but not view 
the complete books or even complete pages (the “Library Project”).15 Considering only 
the Google Litigation, however, would be a constrained examination of fair use as a key 
 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord…."  However, 
the purchaser generally cannot copy the book without obtaining the permission of the publisher, because 
under §106(1) controlling copying/reproduction is one of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder. 
12 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 and 348 (1991) ("The 
mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected"); 17 
U.S.C. §102(b)  ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); and Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534 (§102(b) "embodies the 
common-law idea-expression dichotomy that distinguishes the spheres of copyright and patent law"). 
13 See Sony 464 U.S. at 433 ("Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the 
copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use").  17 U.S.C. §107 provides in part, 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."   
14 See L. Weinreb, "Fair Use," 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1291 (March 1999) (hereafter "Fair Use"), 
quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass 1841).  In his dissent in Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984), Justice Blackmun said the "doctrine of fair use has 
been called with some justification, 'the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright'."   
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to broadening access to knowledge.  This article therefore also considers as a fair use 
the translation of the books in those libraries – without permission from the copyright 
holders – into the native languages of citizens of developing countries in order to lessen 
the divide between information-rich and information-poor countries. 
The reason for adding the issue of translations to an analysis of the 
Google Litigation is that the Google Database will not satisfy Nelson Mandella's concern 
that citizens of information-poor countries lack sufficient access to information.  An 
index in English – and identifying the location of books written in English – will not 
provide meaningful access to individuals who only speak Kikuyu or one of the other 
native languages of millions of citizens of developing countries.16 Just as President 
Clinton pointed out that "[e]ducation closes the gap in America between opportunity and 
the reality of being able to access it,"17 a key to closing the information gap between 
countries is the translation of literary works into the native languages of citizens of 
developing countries.  Although copyright law does not protect ideas and facts from 
copying and distribution,18 for hundreds of years people have distributed information 
through the written expression of ideas and facts.  Limitations on the copying of such 
 
15 At §II.A below this article summarizes the Google Litigation. 
16 Technically, everyone with Internet access will have access to the Google Database, but to those 
who do not speak English, that access will not be meaningful.  Of course, even an index in English will 
not directly help individuals who speak but cannot read English, or those who can read English but cannot 
obtain copies of those books to read.  Similarly, an index in Kikuyu and books in Kikuyu will not directly 
help those who can speak but not read Kikuyu.  That only emphasizes the enormity of the problem 
referred to as the digital divide.  See note 3 above and note 33 below.  
17 See speech of President Clinton at John Muir Middle School in San Jose, California in August, 
1997, at http://72.14.209./04/search?q=cache:WQg01kdlPzAV:www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/, visited 
7/13/2006. 
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expression can decrease the creation of future works containing important information 
and thus limit access to information.19 That is where fair use enters the picture.20 
Google is a modern Goliath, with a market value of over 
$100,000,000,000, far greater than the gross domestic product of Kenya.21 If, as this 
article contends, it is fair use for giants such as Google to create the Library Project, it 
also should be a fair use for nonprofit Davids in the United States to translate the works 
in the Google Database into Kikuyu, the language of the largest ethnic group in Kenya, 
and provide those translations to students in Kenya, who would otherwise not have 
access to that knowledge.22 As a shorthand term, this article uses "Kikuyu Key" to refer 
to the translation of literary works by non-profit entities into the native languages of 
 
18 As stated in n. 12 above, 17 U.S.C. §102(b) provides in part that "[i]n no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery…." 
19 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis Of Copyright Law," 18 Journal Of Legal 
Studies," 325, 332 (1989) (hereafter "Economic Analysis") ("beyond some level copyright protection may 
actually be counterproductive by raising the cost of expression"); R.A. Posner, "Do We Have Too Many 
Intellectual Property Rights," 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 173, 178-179 (Summer 2005) (hereafter "Too 
Many") ("A second reason that we don't want to have universal propertization of intellectual property as of 
physical property is that there is a greater monopoly potential for intellectual property, precisely because 
there are no spatial limits on a piece of such property …. suppose that people who copy an operating 
system are mainly people who could not afford to, and would not, buy the operating system from the 
producer – maybe they live in the third world …. the producer is not actually losing any sales as a result 
of this unauthorized copying"). 
20 Givers, Takers, at n. 5 above, p. 152 ("Fair use simultaneously protects the incentive to create 
new works while protecting the public's right of access"). 
21 Google had a reported market capitalization of approximately $114,240,000,000 as of August 9, 
2006.  See http://finance.yahoo.com/q_/ks?s=COOG, visited 8/9/2006.  Kenya had a reported gross 
domestic product of $16,100,000,000 in 2004.  See 
http://encarta.msn.com/fact_631504793/Kenya_Facts_and_Figures.html, visited 8/9/2006. 
22 See http://mnsu.edu/emuseum/cultural/oldworld/africa/kikuyu.html, visited 7/15/06.  Of course, 
the opponents of the Library Project assert that fair use should not protect Google.  This article only uses 
Kikuyu as an example of a native language.  The same arguments set forth here would also apply to 
large numbers of other languages. 
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developing countries without paying a license fee to, or receiving permission from, the 
copyright holders of the works.23 
What deters developing countries from translating into the native 
languages of their citizens works of importance to the education of their citizens?24 One 
answer is that due to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights ("TRIPS"),25 developing countries cannot – with impunity – disregard the 
copyright laws of other countries and translate English works into the native languages 
of their citizens without permission of the copyright holders.26 Under TRIPS, in order to 
participate in certain trade benefits and avoid sanctions, developing countries must 
adopt and enforce intellectual property laws complying with certain standards that 
protect not only the literary works of the developing country but the works of 
economically developed countries.27 Although under TRIPS developing countries have 
 
23 This article uses the term "developing countries" to include (1) countries with low levels of 
economic development and (2) the least developed countries that many people may not consider to be 
developing.  See discussion of developing countries and least developed countries at 
http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:Jg0oo5y6s_wJ:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developing_country+developi
ng+countries+and+less+developed+countries&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1, visited 8/9/2006, and  
http://www.wto.org_/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm and 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/devl_e.htm, both visited 8/10/2006. 
24 Assuming the developing countries had the resources to create such translations. 
25 10 Nimmer on Copyright, at Appendix 42 (n. 7 above). 
26 See also Article 8 of the World Intellectual Property Copyright Treaty ("authors of literary and 
artistic works protected by this convention shall enjoy the exclusive right of making and of authorizing the 
translation of their works throughout the term of protection of their rights in the original works") at 10 
Nimmer on Copyright App. 50-14 (n. 7 above). 
27 The "adoption in 1994 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) …. provided broader protections for intellectual property rights by granting most favored nation 
treatment for all signatories, establishing minimum terms of protection, increasing significant local 
enforcement and dispute settlement requirements, and authorizing trade sanctions against noncompliant 
nations."  R.C. Bird, "Defending Intellectual Property Rights In The BRIC Economies," 43 Am. Bus. L. J. 
317, 324-325 (Summer, 2006) (hereafter "BRIC") (BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China).  See 
also D. C. K. Chow and T. Schoenbaum, International Business Transactions Problems, Cases, and 
Materials, Aspen Publishers (2005), pp. 360-361 and 626-628; and 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm, visited 8/10/2006. 
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certain leeway in the adoption and implementation of their copyright laws, the 
economically developed countries pressure developing countries to maximize copyright 
protection afforded to works of authorship.28 If U.S. courts implement a flexible fair use 
that promotes the expansion of access to knowledge – such as translations – then the 
developing countries may not have to face the pressure from developed countries to 
maximize copyright protection in their own countries. 
Part II of this article reviews U.S. copyright law and then analyzes the four 
Supreme Court decisions addressing fair use – none involving digital media – since the 
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976:  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios,29 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,30 Stewart v. Abend,31 
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.32 Part II explains that the Supreme Court has 
recognized that increased access resulting from a defendant's work is a factor favoring 
fair use, but has not expressly analyzed how to apply the issue of increased access.  
 
28 "there is considerable flexibility in how the rights and protected subject matter are defined, 
owned, managed, or subject to exceptions.  In the area of enforcement, the Agreement recognizes that 
the implementation in a given WTO member may be impacted by the availability of resources.  United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") published a detailed document on the 
flexibility of TRIPS."  D. J. Gervais, "Intellectual Property, Trade & Development:  The State Of Play," 74 
Fordham L. Rev. 505, 526-527 (November 2005) (hereafter "Trade & Development").  On the issue of 
coercion, see BRIC, n. 27 above, at p. 334 ("Threats of a trade war encouraged China to enact more 
stringent copyright laws and close pirating factories.  Russia improved its copyright laws under threat from 
the United States to withhold ratification of a trade agreement granting Russia preferential trade status.  
Economic pressure forced India to accede to the intellectual property standards of TRIPS");  C. M. Arnold, 
"Protecting Intellectual Property In The Developing World:  Next Step – Thailand", 2006 Duke Law & 
Technology Review (March 2006); and Trade & Development, at 535 ("IP developments in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements mirror the so-called 'maximalist' approach"). 
29 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
30 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
31 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
32 510 U.S. 569 (1994). See discussion of these four Supreme Court decisions in G.M. Duhl, "Old 
Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, And Copycat Comic Books:  The Fourth Fair Use Factor In U.S. Copyright Law,
54 Syracuse Law Review 665, 693-697 (2004) (hereafter "Old Lyrics"). 
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Part II then summarizes fair use issues that remain unanswered with respect to the 
Library Project and Kikuyu Key after these four Supreme Court decisions. 
Part III examines these fair use issues applicable to the Library Project 
that remain unanswered by the Supreme Court.  Part III argues that when, as viewed by 
the consumer, the third party's work (a) is not substantially similar to the original work(s) 
and (b) gives the public a type of work that the copyright holder would not provide, the 
increased access resulting from the third party's work strongly favors fair use and 
justifies disregarding the interim copying of the original work(s).  Part III concludes that 
because (1) it increases access to knowledge that the individual copyright holders 
would not provide and (2)  the users of the Library Project will only see selected quotes 
from the original works that by themselves would not infringe the original works, the 
Library Project is a fair use. 
Part IV sets forth the Kikuyu Key principle that fair use is not simply an 
economic equation, but takes into account social welfare that cannot be measured in 
dollars and cents.  Part IV distinguishes the facts assumed for the Kikuyu Key from 
lower court cases holding certain translations of literary works were not fair use.  Part IV 
argues that the Kikuyu Key should be a fair use, because (1) it would increase access 
to knowledge in parts of the world that are in dire need of such knowledge and that 
cannot pay for it; (2) translations involve many subjective/original analyses, not rote 
copying; and (3) the parties providing the translations would be not-for-profit entities.33 
33 Having books printed in the native language of citizens of developing countries is only one facet 
access of the issue.  See Information Revolution at n. 4 above.  Actually getting those books to the 
people who need them, and making sure there are the educators in place to help students make use of 
10 
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Part V puts aside the technical fair use tests and concludes by arguing 
that basic considerations of fairness lead to the same conclusion as case law:   
• Making interim, exact copies of original copyrighted works 
that are not substantially seen by the public in its use of the 
electronic database should be a fair use; and   
• Translations by nonprofit entities into the native languages of 
citizens of developing countries, even though the translators 
do not receive permission from or pay license fees to the 
copyright holders, should be a fair use.   
In both situations, increasing meaningful access to knowledge is the key to an 
application of fair use that could start decreasing the gap between the information-rich 
and information-poor.34 
II. INCREASING ACCESS AS A FACTOR FAVORING FAIR USE 
A. The Google Library Litigation 
On October 19, 2005, The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. and other 
copyright holders (the "McGraw Plaintiffs") sued Google, Inc. in the Southern District of 
New York and claimed that the implementation of the Library Project would constitute 
 
the knowledge, are separate issues beyond the scope of this article and copyright law.  Yet if there is no 
solution to the copyright bottleneck of supply, there can be no solution to the other factors preventing 
meaningful access to knowledge in the developing countries.  Under the acronym A2K, many persons 
and agencies are promoting access to knowledge worldwide.  See n. 3 above and 
http://www.access2knowledge.org/cs, visited 8/13/06.  If promoting a right to access can break the 
copyright bottleneck, then perhaps the A2K movement can progress more rapidly than many would 
predict, just as the open source software movement, through the use of massive participation by 
individual programmers, has expanded more rapidly than most people anticipated. 
34 The Library Project will increase access to information for a different group of individuals than the 
Kikuyu Key.  These are simply two examples of applying fair use to increase access to knowledge.  
Meaningful access is important, because as indicated in n. 16 above, someone who only speaks and 
reads Kikuyu may have physical access to a book printed in English, but that access will not help her 
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copyright infringement (the "Google Complaint").35 Some of the 5 participating libraries 
only authorized the scanning of works no longer protected by copyright, and some had 
not been not clear in statements to the public what scanning they had authorized.36 
However, the University of Michigan agreed to make available to Google, for Google's 
reproduction and display, all books in Michigan's collection, even those books still 
protected by copyright.37 
The Google Database will be a database of the words and arrangement of 
words from the books scanned by Google and available for limited use by the public.38 
In response to search queries typed by the general public into the dialogue box for the 
Google Database, users will be able to browse the full text of public domain materials, 
but for books still covered by copyright, users will see "no more than two or three 
sentences of text surrounding the search term to help them determine whether they've 
 
35 See http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html, visited 5/11/2006, and 
http://pubs.bna.con/ip/BNA/ptc.nsf/is/a0b1v4r6v6.  For a complete copy of the complaint, see 
http://pub.bna.com/ptcy/058881.pdf, both visited October 21, 2005.  This article refers to this complaint as 
the Google Complaint, even though on September 20, 2005, the Authors' Guild and certain individual 
authors filed a complaint raising similar issues to the Complaint filed by McGraw Hill and others in the 
Southern District of New York.  The complaint filed by the Authors' Guild case was filed as a class action.  
See http://www.authorsguild.org/news/sues_google_citing.htm, visited 8/13/06.  A June 6, 2006, report on 
Yahoo said that in Paris, La Martiniere, a French publisher, was suing Google and its French subsidiary 
over the Library Project. See http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060606/tc_afp/afpentertainmentfrance,
visited 6/23/06. 
36 ¶27 of Google Complaint.  The Google Complaint listed 5 participating libraries.  ¶ 27.  
Presumably the libraries made clear to Google what scanning they had authorized and what scanning 
they had not authorized.  On August 10, 2006, the San Diego Union-Tribune reported that the University 
of California was joining the Library Project.  The story said the project "saves the content of UC's aging 
books by digitally scanning them, largely at Google's expense.  If UC were to scan the books, it would 
cost $30 to $40 per book ….  The arrangement cuts UC's costs to $1 per book ….  Google stands to 
benefit with advertising revenue from increased traffic to its site."  See 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/education/20060810-999-1n, visited 8/13/06. 
37 ¶28 of the Google Complaint.  For statements from librarians at the now 6 participating libraries, 
see http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html, visited 8/13/06. 
38 See http://books.google.com/googlebooks/about.html, visited 5/12/06. 
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found what they're looking for."39 Google also has a Partner Program, in which Google 
has obtained the permission of publishers/copyright holders to scan the books and put a 
limited number of pages on the Internet and links to the publishers.40 The McGraw 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the legality of the Partner Program.41 
The creation and use of the Google Database for the Library Project will 
involve three levels of copying.  First, Google or some company acting under contract 
with Google has to scan all the paper books into digital format.  Scanning each book will 
create a new copy of each book, without the consent of the copyright holder.42 Second, 
whenever a user searches the database, presumably the scanned works will be loaded 
into the RAM of a server or servers in order for the search engine to determine which 
works contain the words inputted by the user.43 Loading a program and database into 
 
39 See http://books.google.com/googlebooks/newsviews/issue.html, visited 8/13/06.  It is not clear 
how the Library Project will limit the displays to 2 or 3 sentences if the search terms are found on many 
pages of the book, but this article assumes that the Library Project will so limit the displays. 
40 ¶30 of Google Complaint; http://books.google.com/googlebooks/about.html;
http://books.google.com/googleprint/library.html; and 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/publisher.html, all visited 8/13/06. 
41 ¶¶30 and 31 of the Google Complaint.  The Complaint refers to this program as the Print Program 
for Publishers, whereas the August 2006 Google web page uses the term Partner Program. 
42 17 U.S.C. §106 specifically provides that subject to certain exceptions in §§107-122, "the owner 
of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:  (1) to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." 
43 "RAM (random access memory) is the place in a computer where the operating system, 
application programs, and data in current use are kept so that they can be quickly reached by the 
computer's processor….  However, the data in RAM stays there only as long as your computer is running. 
When you turn the computer off, RAM loses its data."  See, 
http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid40_gci214255,00.html, visited 
5/26/2006.  A "server is a computer program that provides services to other computer programs (and their 
users) in the same or other computers….  The computer that a server program runs in is also frequently 
referred to as a server….  In the client/server programming model, a server is a program that awaits and 
fulfills requests from client programs in the same or other computers….  Specific to the Web, a Web 
server is the computer program (housed in a computer) that serves requested HTML pages or files."  
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RAM constitutes making a copy under copyright law.44 Third, the database will display 
to the user the results of the search. 
Google allows any publisher to opt out of having any copyrighted books of 
that publisher scanned.45 The Google Complaint rejects this opt-out provision as 
unsatisfactory, stating that 17 U.S.C. §106 "squarely put[s] the burden on Google either 
to obtain the permission from copyright owners to copy and make use of copyrighted 
books or exclude them from the Google Library Project."46 
The Google Complaint rejects the position of Google that the 
scanning/copying is a permitted fair use, "a necessary step to making them available for 
searching through www.google.com, where excerpts from the books retrieved through 
the search will be presented to the user."47 The McGraw Plaintiffs distinguish between 
the Library Project and Google's general copying of web pages for its search engines.  
The McGraw Plaintiffs suggest that the copying of web pages may be justified, because 
"website owners have allowed their sites to be searchable via a Google (or other) 
search engine by not adopting one or more technological measures" that would block 
such copying by search engines.48 Among other relief, the McGraw Plaintiffs asks for 
an order enjoining "Google from, in any manner, reproducing, publicly distributing and/or 
publicly displaying all or any part of any publisher's copyrighted works as part of the 
 
44 See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Associates, Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("the 
loading of software from some permanent storage medium, such as a floppy disk or a computer's hard 
drive, to the computer's random access memory ('RAM') when the software is 'booted up' causes a copy 
to be made") and Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d, 1330, 1333, n.4, 1335 (9th 
Cir. 1995), citing MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993). 
45 http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43786&top, visited 8/13/06. 
46 ¶33 of Google Complaint. 
47 ¶29 of Google Complaint.  
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Google Library Project, or otherwise, except upon the express prior authorization of the 
Publisher owning or controlling the copyrights in such works."49 
The details of the Library Project are likely to change over time.50 In 
addition, there are a variety of scanning projects by other entities that may raise similar 
issues – or may answer certain issues raised in the Google Complaint.51 In this digital 
age, the copyright targets and responses will continue to move.  That makes the broad 
discussion of the fair use principles in this article the appropriate preparation for 
whatever the landscape will be in the future, as content owners try to build more walls 
around their content and others try to break down those walls.52 
48 Id. 
49 Prayer for Relief 2 in the Google Complaint. 
50 Google has announced, for instance, that it wants "to include books from all the world's 
languages and cultures."  http://books.google.com/support/bin/answers.py?answer=43745ofctx.
51 Amazon put pages of certain books on its web site and changed the displays in apparent 
response to concerns expressed by the Authors Guild.  See 
http://www.authorsguild.org/news/10_24_03htm; http://www.authorsguild.org/news/aap_press_amazon.ht
m; and http://www.authorsguild.org/news/10_03_amazon.htm, all visited 8/13/06.  For an analysis of 
issues pertaining to Amazon's Search Inside the Book Program, see J. Kerry – Tyerman, "No Analog 
Analogue:  Searchable Digital Archives and Amazon's Unprecedented Search Inside the Book Program 
as Fair Use," 2006 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. N1 (2006).  The Open Content Alliance has announced it is 
"building a digital archive of global content for universal access," but that apparently nothing will be put 
into the archive without the consent of the copyright holders.  See http://www.opencontentalliance.org,
visited 8/13/06.  While the Open Content Alliance says it will be administered by a nonprofit entity, 
contributing members include for profit entities such as Xerox and Yahoo!  
http://www.opencontentalliance.org/contributors.html, visited 8/13/06. 
52 For analyses of the Google Litigation by other lawyers, law students and lay people, see H. 
Travis, "Building Universal Digital Libraries:  An Agenda For Copyright Reform," 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 761 
(2006); J. Bard, "The Google Library Project: The Copyright Debate," American Library Association, 
http://ala.org/____washoff/oitp/googlepaperfnl.pdf, visited 8/13/06; and transcript of November 17, 2005 
forum titled "The Battle Over Books.  Authors And Publishers Take On The Google Print Library Project," 
http://www.nypl.org/research/calendar/imagesprog/google111705.pdf, visited 8/13/06.  See also E.A. 
Proskine, "Google's Technocolor Dreamcoat:  A Copyright Analysis Of The Google Book Library Project," 
21 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 213 (2006); E. Hanratty, "Google Library: Beyond Fair Use," 2006 Duke Law & 
Technology Review 10 (2005); M. Goldstein, "Google's Literary Quest In Peril," 2005 B.C. Intell. Property 
& Technology Forum 110301 (November 2005); and K. Kelly, "Scan This Book," May 14, 2006 edition of 
New York Times Magazine.  
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B. Copyright Law Regulates Literary Works to Benefit the 
Public 
The Google Plaintiffs appear to view copyrights as natural rights, but the 
Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution neither grants to, nor recognizes any rights in, 
authors.53 The Copyright Clause instead is a grant of power to and a limitation on the 
power of Congress.54 The principle behind this grant/limitation is that by giving authors 
certain rights, Congress will provide financial incentives for individuals to create literary 
works, and society will benefit as a result of access to those works.55 Following that 
 
53 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834)("That congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not 
legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear, from the provision that the author, &c 'shall have 
the sole right and liberty of printing,' &c.  Now, if this exclusive right existed at common law, and congress 
were about to adopt legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used this language?  Could 
they have deemed it necessary to vest a right already vested.  Such a presumption is refuted by the 
words above quoted….  Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended 
for, created it.").  Article 1, section 8 clause 1 of the Constitution also authorizes the adoption of patent 
laws, but since this article only discusses copyrights, this article refers to the clause as the Copyright 
Clause, as the Supreme Court has referred to it at times.  See, eg., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 790 
(2003) ("the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, 
overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause"). 
54 Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).  There are many different 
analytical models of copyright law.  See J. Garon, ""Normative Copyright:  A Conceptual Framework for 
Copyright Philosophy and Ethics," 88 Cornell Law Review 1278 (July 2003) (hereafter Normative 
Copyright).  Garon says, "Copyright law finds its basis in one of two discrete philosophies: the natural 
rights inherent in the law or the economic rights recognized by statute."  Id. at 1293.   In Cable News 
Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1991), the 
Eleventh Circuit said, "Copyright simultaneously has two aspects, one proprietary and the other 
regulatory," citing L. Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," 40 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1, 5 (1987).  
Under any model, access is an important issue to consider, depending on the specific facts.  See 
Normative Copyright, at 1310 ("As Landes and Posner have stated, '[s]triking the correct balance 
between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law," quoting Landes and Posner, "An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989)). 
55 The Supreme Court has said progress of the science and arts, rather than economic reward, is 
the primary goal of the Copyright Clause.  In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), quoting United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948), the Supreme Court said, "copyright law, like the 
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."  In Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), the Supreme Court said, "Creative work is to be encouraged 
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts."  However, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 785, n. 
18, the Court seemed to balance economic incentives and public purpose, saying the "two ends are not 




©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 
principle, the "Copyright Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides 
an economic incentive for authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the 
public."56 
The fact that the copyright statutes protect an original "work" of authorship 
and give the copyright holder rights with respect to certain uses of that work – such as 
copying – does not mean copyright protects all parts of the work from copying.57 For 
instance, "in no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery regardless of the form."58 In any copyrighted work there are at some level 
elements that copyright law does not protect, such as individual words in a book (in 
contrast to the arrangement of the words).59 In addition, "[w]here the 'expression is 
essential to the statement of the idea',… or where there is only one way or very few 
ways of expressing the idea…, the idea and expression are said to have 'merged'.  In 
 
56 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 US 539, 558 (1985). 
57 See 17 U.S.C. §102(a); and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 
(1991) ("The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be 
protected.").  In fact the Copyright Act does not define "work."  See J. Hughes, "Size Matters (Or Should) 
In Copyright Law," 74 Fordham Law Review 575 (November 2005) (hereafter "Size Matters"). 
58 17 U.S.C. §102(b). 
59 For instance, 37 CFR §202.1 provides that words and short phrases are not subject to copyright 
protection.  See also Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286-7 (3rd Cir. 2004) ("We believe 
the Copyright Office's longstanding practice of denying registration to short phrases merits 
deference….and believe that it logically extends to numbers").  Whether the reason copyright does not 
protect short phrases and words is that short phrases and words are not original or that they are not 
"works" is not clear.  See Size Matters, n. 57 above, at p. 604, 605, 607 & 610 ("the dominant justification 
for the Rule 202 bar [37 CFR §202.1(a)] is that short phrases simply lack the modicum of creativity for 
protection under copyright….  Even assuming that the shorter the phrase is, the less likely it is to be 
original, that does not deny the existence of thousands or millions of short phrases that are original 
enough to cross the modicum of the creativity threshold ….  The reasons for a minimum size principle 
today are no different than they have always been:  (a) Protecting microworks would do no good and (b) 
protecting microworks would do some harm."). 
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these instances, copyright protection does not exist."60 Similarly, the doctrine of scènes 
à faire (such as stock scenes or phrases) can preclude copyright protection for all or 
part of a work.61 
Fair use of a copyrighted work by a third party is not copyright 
infringement.62 The fair use statute lists four factors courts must consider in determining 
whether a particular use of a work is a fair use: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion of the work 
used; and (4) effect on the use of the new work on the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.63 The four fair use factors listed in §107 for courts to consider are 
"illustrative," not definitive, "[n]or may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, 
one from another.  All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of 
the purposes of copyright."64 Scholars have suggested a variety of different approaches 
 
60 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 535.  (Emphasis added). 
61 Id. at 536.  (In "the computer-software context, the [scènes à faire] doctrine means that the 
elements of a program dictated by practical realities — e.g., by hardware standards and mechanical 
specifications, software standards and compatibility requirements, computer manufacturer design 
standards, target industry practices, and standard computer programming practices — may not obtain 
protection….") 
62 (whether fair use is characterized as a right, an affirmative defense or a privilege).  In Bateman v. 
Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532, 1542, n.22 (11th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit said, "Although the traditional 
approach is to view 'fair use' as an affirmative defense, this writer, speaking only for himself, is of the 
opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976.   Originally, as a judicial 
doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was an infringement that was excused-this is presumably 
why it was treated as a defense.   As a statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement.   Thus, 
since the passage of the 1976 Act, fair use should no longer be considered an infringement to be 
excused;  instead, it is logical to view fair use as a right.   Regardless of how fair use is viewed, it is clear 
that the burden of proving fair use is always on the putative infringer."  In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,
650 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D. N.Y. 1986), the district court said, "'Fair use' is a 'privilege in others than the 
owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent….'" 
(internal citations omitted).   
63 17 U.S.C. §107.  
64 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-578 (1994).  Campbell involved a parody 
of the song, "Oh, Pretty Woman."  
18 
 
©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 
to the application of fair use, including broad, alternative formulations.65 The courts, 
however, have not adopted a single formulation but have instead applied fair use on a 
case-by-case basis.66 
From the above examples, it is apparent that copyrights reflect a 
regulatory scheme, not indivisible property rights or "natural rights" uniformly 
enforceable against all parties.67 For instance, in addition to the fact that copyright law 
does not protect all part of a copyrighted work, two authors can have copyrights in 
 
65 See, e.g., W. Gordon, "Fair Use As Market Failure, n. 18 above; Betamax Case And Its 
Predecessors," 82 Columbia Law Review 1600 (Dec. 1982) (hereafter "Market Failure"); W. Fisher III, 
"Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine" 101 Harvard Law Review, 1659 (1988) (herafter 
"Reconstructing"); P. Leval, "Toward A Fair Use Standard," 103 Harvard Law Review, 1105 (1990) 
(hereafter "Standard"); Givers, Takers, n. 5 above; and D. Burk and J. Cohen, "Fair Use Infrastructure for 
Rights Management Systems," 15 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (Fall 2001) (hereafter "Rights 
Management Systems").   
66 Sony, 464 U.S. at 448, n. 31  (1984)("the courts must be free to adopt the doctrine [of fair use] to 
particular situations on a case by case basis.");  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 ("fair use analysis must 
always be tailored to the individual case"); and Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (fair use "calls for case-by-case 
analysis."). 
67 P. Samuelson, "Fair Use For Computer Programs And Other Copyrightable Works In Digital 
Form:  The Implications Of Sony, Galoob and Sega," 1 J. Intell. Property Law 49, 116 (Fall 1993) 
(hereafter Sony, Galoob) ("The strict property-rights view of copyright for which universal argued in Sony 
was rejected by the Court, which instead seemed to view copyright law as more of a regulatory regime 
aimed at achieving a balance among the interests of copyright owners, the consuming public and other 
commercial participants in the marketplace, such that the rights granted to authors under the statute 
should be construed as reaching no further than Congress has intended to achieve this balance."  Even 
to the extent one considers copyright a type of property, it is significantly different from physical property.  
Too Many, n. 19 above at 174-175 ("intellectual property rights tend to be limited in duration ….  There 
are also significant scope limitations in intellectual property rights….  Fair use allows some appropriation 
of intellectual property without the permission of the owner-unlicensed copying that is nevertheless lawful.  
In these three respects intellectual property is really quite different from physical property.")  See also 
Normative Copyright, n. 54 above at 1306-1307 ("The power to create a balance between the author and 
the public may be the most significant philosophical distinction between a natural rights theory of 
copyright and an economic rationale.  Under the natural rights theory the power over one's writing is a 
'sacred' liberty that cannot be for the public good, whereas the economic rationale allows for a balancing 
between the interests of the public in accessing the good and the right of the author to receive an 
economic reward").  Whether considered regulatory or property law, "[s]triking the correct balance 
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identical literary works, if both authors created the works independently.68 
Notwithstanding the six rights granted to copyright holders in §106, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work by someone who is not the copyright holder is not an infringement of a 
copyright. 69 Under the fair use statute, a copyright holder may prevent one person from 
copying his work but not be able to prevent a second person from copying, because the 
second person is making a fair use of the original work.70 
The regulatory balance referred to above has changed over the years.  
First, "the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology," increasing the works copyright law protects.71 For instance, Congress only 
protected maps, charts and books in 1790, but subsequently Congress protected 
photographs (in 1865), motion pictures (in 1912), sound recordings (in 1971) and 
computer programs (by 1980).72 
68 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 ("assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical 
poems.  Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable"). 
69 Supra, n. 62.  Infringement does not only relate to improper copying, but includes a violation of 
any of the six rights listed in §106.  See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 
(4th Cir. 1997) ("distributing unlawful copies of a copyrighted work does violate the copyright owner's 
distribution right and, as a result, constitutes copyright infringement"); and Microsoft Corp. v. Software 
Wholesale Club, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ("To establish copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must prove both ownership in the copyrights at issue and encroachment by the defendant upon 
one of these six exclusive rights").  Each of the 6 exclusive rights is subject to the fair use defense.  See 
17 U.S.C. §106 ("Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize…."); and 17 U.S.C. §107 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of 
sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section … is not an infringement of copyright"). 
70 For instance, it seems clear from the decision in Sony, discussed below at II B, that if the 
evidence had been one set of individuals making copies of television broadcasts had simply been viewing 
the tapes of the shows in their homes, but another set of families had been selling the tapes they made of 
the television shows, the first group of home viewers would have been protected by fair use (as the 
decision held), but the second group of homes viewers would have been liable for infringement, even 
though the "property" of the plaintiffs would have been the same in both situations. 
71 Sony, 484 U.S. at 430. 
72 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208-214 (1954); L. Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and 
Fair Use," 40 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1, 48-53 (1987) (hereafter "Free Speech"); 1 Nimmer on Copyright, at pp. 
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Over time Congress has also made it easier to obtain federal copyrights 
for, and has increased the protections afforded to, works of authorship.73 For instance, 
as of January 1, 1978, authors for the first time could have federal copyrights in 
unpublished works.74 Effective March 1, 1989, authors in the United States no longer 
had to put copyright notices on their works in order to gain federal copyright 
protection.75 Also, from an initial copyright term of 14 years in 1790, renewable once for 
a second 14 year term, Congress has now extended the general copyright term on new 
literary works to the life of the author plus 70 years.76 
In 1998, moreover, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
("DMCA"), providing copyright holders with significant new legal tools to help prevent 
third parties from accessing and copying software and other digital content made 
possible by the explosion of digital media.77 Among other things, the DMCA provides, 
 
OV 1-15 and 8 Nimmer on Copyright, at app. 7-4[D][1] (see n. 7 above).  Whether copyright law protected 
computer programs before or immediately after the Copyright Act of 1976, it became clear with the 
addition of a definition of "computer program" in 17 U.S.C. 101 as the result of the passage of PL 96-517, 
94 Stat. 3015, in 1980 that copyright law protected computer programs.  R. Nimmer, "Law of Computer 
Technology," (hereafter Computer Technology) 1:9, pp. 1-28-30; and 5 U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, 96th Congress, Second Session (1980), House Report 96-1307, p. 6482. 
73 17 USC §102(a) provides that "[w]orks of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and other choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) 
architectural works."  Computer programs are a type of literary work.  See n. 71 above and 17 USC §101. 
74 1 Nimmer on Copyright at §5.01[A], p. 5-4.1 (n. 7 above). 
75 7 Nimmer on Copyright at §7.01[A], p. 7-8 (n. 7 above). 
76 3 Nimmer on Copyright at §9.01, p. 9-4 (n. 7 above). 
77 D. Nimmer "A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act," 148 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 673, 674 (January, 2000) ("In late 1998, the Congress enacted its most 
sweeping revisions ever to the Copyright Act of 1976") (hereafter "Riff"); and Committee on Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Emerging Information Infrastructure, "The Digital Dilemma.  Intellectual Property 
in the Information Age" (National Academy Press)(2000) (hereafter "Digital Dilemma"), p. 2 ("information 
in digital form … has arrived accompanied by contradictory powers and promises …. it promises more – 
more quantity, quality, and access – while imperiling one means of rewarding those who create and 
publish.  It is at once a remarkably powerful medium for publishing and distributing information, and the 
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"No person shall manufacture … or otherwise traffic in any technology … that – (A) is 
primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title…."78 
In spite of this increase in the rights of copyright holders, fair use is not an 
appendix, but an essential component of the copyright regulatory system.79 Indeed, the 
"fair use right was codified to maintain the constitutionally mandated balance to ensure 
that the public has access to knowledge."80 Courts have recognized that they are free 
 
world's largest reproduction facility.")  This Committee addressed the issue of access throughout the work 
and said the "Constitution provides for intellectual property protection with the pragmatic goal of 
promoting the public interest in access to knowledge and innovation."  Id. at 97. 
78 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2).  Other sections say the DMCA shall not affect fair use (17 U.S.C. 
§1201(c)) and provide limited exemptions for reverse engineering (17 U.S.C. §1201(f)).  The DMCA has 
been the subject of much scholarly comment and criticism.  See, e.g., Riff, n. 76 above at 739-740 ("The 
tension between property rights and user-access rights … has been a ceaseless part of the millennium 
now ending ….  The user safeguards [in the DMCA] so proudly heralded as securing balance between 
owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to achieve their stated goal"); J. Littman, Digital
Copyright, Prometheus Books (2001), 144-145 ("There is no overarching vision of the public interest 
animating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act"); P. Samuelson, "Intellectual Property and the Digital 
Economy:  Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised," 14 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 519, 
557 (Spring 1999) ("Unless the anti-device provisions of the DMCA are modified, either by narrow judicial 
interpretation or by legislative amendments, they are likely to have harmful effects on competition and 
innovation in the high technology sector"); and J. Ginsberg, "Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet," 
24 Columbia-VLA Journal of Law and the Arts 1, 45 (Fall 2000) ("The tools the DMCA and copyright case 
law give copyright owners to confront copyright use on the Internet should be employed to promote broad 
distribution of works of authorship at reasonable, and variable prices.  If copyright owners instead wield 
those tools to enhance control without facilitating dissemination, we can expect to see courts expand the 
zones of excused uses, whether or not the uses are doctrinally persuasive").  While the provisions of the 
DMCA are not directly applicable to the Google Litigation, the concern over preserving a balance between 
the interests of copyright holders and potential users expressed in the articles mentioned in this note is 
relevant to the issue of access discussed in this article. 
79 See Givers, Takers, n. 5 above, at p. 113 ("as owners' rights are expanded to respond to the 
ease with which digital technology enables large scale infringement, users' rights should, correspondingly, 
be reconceived to reflect the variety of ways the internet facilitates-indeed encourages—production, 
access and use of copyrighted content.").  Professor Okediji focused and said "I would eliminate the 
traditional fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work, 
as an element of fair use and instead apply it as one of the measurements for damages if infringement 
and not fair use were to be found."  Id. at 168.  Adoption of this proposal would require a legislative 
change to §107.   Professor Okediji concluded that "Fair use offers welfare maximizing efficiencies in the 
allocation of the most important resource of the global economy, namely, information."  Id. at 182. 
80 SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1261. 
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to adopt the doctrine of fair use to particular situations on a case by case basis.81 
Congress has recognized that the application of the fair use statute should change over 
time.82 
If copyright created an indivisible property right, as the Google Plaintiffs 
appear to argue, then each potential fair use would be a restriction on the rights of 
property holders, and increasing access to literary works might reasonably not be a 
factor to consider in evaluating whether a third party's use was a fair use.  However, the 
Copyright Clause did not recognize or create any rights.83 The copyright statutes do not 
give a person a Due Process property right, but simply provide that authors of original 
works may receive certain benefits in the future, depending on the facts.84 Copyright 
and fair use are an exercise in balance, as evidenced by the facts that (a) a person's 
right to control copying of her work depends in part on the purpose of the copying by the 
third party, (b) a copyright holder cannot protect all parts of her work, and (c) two people 
 
81 Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-449, n. 31.  Quoting from H. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp. 65-66, U.S. Code. 
Cong. & Adm.  News 1976, p. 5680, the Court said "there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the 
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change." 
82 House Report No. 94-1476, accompanying PL94-553, 5 U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, 94th Congress, Second Session 1976, p. 5659, 5680, said in greater detail:  "The bill 
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to 
freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.  Beyond a very 
broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be 
free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.  Section 107 is intended to 
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 
83 Wheaton v. Peters, 333 U.S. at 661, n. 53 above. 
84 American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 US 40, 60-61 (1999):  ("the law expressly limits an 
employee's entitlement to "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment, and requires that disputes 
over the reasonableness and necessity of particular treatment must be resolved before an employer's 
obligation to pay – and an employee's entitlement to benefits – arise….  Thus, for an employee's property 
interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach under state law, the employee must clear two 
hurdles:  First, he must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and second, he must 
establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.  Only then does the 
employee's interest parallel that of the beneficiary of welfare assistance in Goldberg and the recipient of 
disability benefits in Mathews.") 
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can have copyrights in the identical work.85 The four Supreme Court decisions 
discussed in II.C-E below show that meaningful access by the public is a key part of the 
fair use balance. 
C. Sony – Increasing Access Through Time-shifting is a Fair Use 
1. Background 
The first Supreme Court fair use case decided after the effective date of 
the Copyright Act of 1976, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 
involved the use of Sony videotape recorders (VTRs) by consumers to record free 
television broadcasts for subsequent playing in their homes.86 Universal argued that 
Sony was liable for contributory copyright infringement.87 After trial the district court 
denied Universal any relief, but the Ninth Circuit concluded Sony was liable for 
contributory infringement, because of consumer copying of the television shows, and 
reversed.88 In a 5-4 decision,89 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 
 
85 See e.g., notes 63, 57-61 and 68 above. 
86 464 U.S. 417 (1984).   
87 The courts have held that defendants can be liable for copyright infringement committed by third 
parties, even though the Copyright Act does not create such a cause of action.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-5.  
A defendant can be liable for copyright infringement of a third party under the doctrine of contributory 
infringement if the defendant (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing activity and (2) 
induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringing conduct of the third party.  Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2006); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 
1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); and Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 2006 WL 842883, *13 (D.N.J. 
2006).  A defendant can be liable for the copyright infringement of a third party under the doctrine of 
vicarious liability if the defendant (1) supervised or controlled the party or premises on which the 
infringement occurs and (2) received a direct financial benefit from the third party's infringing activities.  
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; and Arista, 2006 WL 842883, *9.  For a critique of the liability of persons who 
in some sense facilitate infringement, see M. Lemley and R. Reese, "Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement without Restricting Innovation," 56 Stanford L. Rev. 1345 (May 2004). 
88 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 (C.D. Calif. 
1979), the district court said, "Harm which 'imperils the existence of a publication' is more destructive of a 
fair use defense than is harm which would 'limit profits.'"  The court also said that "[c]opyright law … does 
not protect authors from change or new considerations in the marketing of their products."  Id. The Ninth 
Circuit reversed, concluding that "when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass 
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that even if Sony's VTR users had infringed the copyrights of the studios by taping the 
broadcasts, there could be no contributory infringement, because the Betamax that 
Sony manufactured had substantial non-infringing uses.90 
The Court also directly addressed whether unauthorized home time-
shifting by the consumer was a fair use.  The majority referred to the fair use doctrine as 
an equitable rule of reason for which "no generally applicable definition is possible" and 
discussed the four fair use factors specified in Section 107.91 The majority concluded 
 
copying of the sort involved in this case precludes an application of fair use."  Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Sony Corporation of America, 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1982).  The Ninth Circuit exhibited concern 
about change when it said "[n]ew technology, which makes possible the mass reproduction of copyrighted 
material (effectively taking control of access from author), places a strain upon the fair use doctrine."  Id. 
at 971.   
89 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the majority of Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Stevens, Brennan, White and O'Connor.  Justice Blackmun filed the dissenting opinion and was joined by 
Justices Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist. 
90 For instance, Fred Rogers (of Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood) "testified that he had absolutely no 
objection to home taping for noncommercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real service to 
families to be able to record children's programs and to show them at appropriate times."  Id. at 445.  This 
was one example of the authorized uses of the Betamax. The Court held that "the sale of copying 
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the 
product is likely used for legitimate unobjectionable purposes."  Id. at 442.  The Court also found in Sony 
that Sony had done nothing to encourage infringing uses (other than making the product).  Id. at 438-439.  
In Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770, the Supreme Court unanimously held "that one who distributes a device 
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."  This 
"inducement theory" of contributory infringement applied even if "the product [was] capable of both lawful 
and unlawful use".  Id. The decision in Grokster is not inconsistent with the decision in Sony. In Sony, the 
majority said the "seller of the equipment that expands those [TV] producers' audience cannot be a 
contributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had no direct involvement with any infringing activity."  
Id. at 446-7.  In Grokster, the Court concluded Grokster had direct involvement with the infringement.  Id. 
at 2779 and 2781. 
91 Id. at 448-450.  It may strike some as ironic that years later, Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. 
sued Connectix Corp. for copyright infringement for reverse engineering (and thus temporarily copying) 
Sony's BIOS software to develop software that would allow a user to play Sony video game cartridges on 
computers rather than Sony game consoles.  The district court preliminarily enjoined Connectix, but the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Connectix's copying was fair use.  See Sony Computer 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Calif. 1999), rev'd 203 F.3d 596 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit's decision in Connectix is discussed below at III.A.3. 
25 
 
©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 
that "the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair 
use."92 
2. The statutory fair use factors93 
The Court considered the first factor, the commercial or nonprofit 
character of the activity, by focusing not on Sony's purpose in making the Betamax, but 
on the use of the Betamax by consumers.94 There was no evidence introduced in the 
litigation that the persons making tapes transferred them to other persons, that home 
recorded tapes were subsequently used for public performances or that persons copied 
programs transmitted on pay or cable television systems.95 Nevertheless, the studios 
argued that Betamax users were engaged in commercial uses, because home taping 
would mean those users would not buy tapes of those programs sold by the copyright 
holder.96 The Court rejected that argument, concluding "the live viewer is no more likely 
to buy pre-recorded videotapes than is the timeshifter."97 
92 464 U.S. at 442. 
93 The text of this article does not discuss the Court's treatment of each of the four statutory fair use 
factors in each of the four fair use cases, but only those factors most relevant to the Library Project and 
Kikuyu Key.  However, the footnotes about the applicable case do refer to the Court's treatment of the 
statutory fair use factors not discussed in the text. 
94 464 U.S. at 425, 448-451.  It does not follow from Sony that the courts should always look at the 
use of products by consumers.  In Sony the claim was that the consumer directly infringed and that Sony 
contributed to that infringement.  The Court in Sony had to consider whether the uses of the consumer 
infringed, because there could be no contributory infringement by Sony if there was no direct 
infringement.  In the Google Litigation, the McGraw Plaintiffs argue that Google is directly infringing their 
copyrights.  See ¶¶ 39-40 of Google Complaint first cited at n. 35 above.   
95 Id. at 425. 
96 Id. at 450, n. 33.   
97 Id. The Court cited no evidence for this conclusion.  The Court suggested that "consumptive 
uses" were not fair uses.  Universal argued that since a theft of jewels was consumptive even if the jewels 
were only worn rather than sold by the thief, making a Betamax copy of a television show was also 
consumptive, even if the copy was not sold.  The majority rejected the analogy, reasoning that a theft of 
jewels would deprive the jewel owner of the right to sell those jewels to any individual, but "[t]imeshifting 
does not even remotely entail comparable consequences to the copyright owner."  Id.  In dissent, Justice 
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The Court only referred to the second and third fair use factors in 
passing.98 However, it is significant that making an essentially identical copy of the 
original work that the consumer saw did not result in a finding of infringement.99 
The Court gave primary attention to the fourth factor and concluded, "a 
use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the 
copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to 
create."100 The Court added that there must be a "showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists."101 In other words, it is 
not sufficient to simply argue that there is an adverse economic effect because a use 
could in theory become widespread.  The plaintiff must present proof that adverse affect 
on the copyright holder's market resulting from the copying is a realistic possibility.102 
Blackmun said one issue was time-shifting, and a "second is 'library-building,' in which the user records a 
program in order to keep it for repeated viewing over a long term."  Id. at 458-9. 
98 The majority said that considering the nature of the work, since "time-shifting merely enables a 
viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in it's entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced… does not have its ordinary affect of militating against the finding of fair 
use."  Id. at 449-450. 
99 Samuelson wrote that Justice Steven's decision reflects the view of "copyright as a limited 
monopoly right" in contrast to Justice Blackmun's dissenting view of copyright as an "exclusive property 
right."  P. Samuelson, "The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice 
Stevens", 74 Fordham Law Review 1831, 1849 (March, 2006) (hereafter "Generativity of Sony"). 
100 Id. at 450  (Emphasis added). 
101 Id. at 451 (Emphasis added).  The dissent took a different position on economic harm by stating 
"at least when the proposed use is an unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a potential for 
harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted work….Proof of actual harm, or even probable 
harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new technology is speculative…."  Id. at 482. 
102 Samuelson says that "perhaps the most important impacts of Sony have been in mitigating the 
significance of 'non-transformative copying of whole works made routinely in today's digital network 
environments."  Generativety of Sony n. 98 above at 1875. 
27 
 
©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 
3. Access as a separate factor 
The Supreme Court recognized increasing access was a factor that 
favored a finding of fair use in Sony.103 The Court noted the district court had found 
time-shifting "served the public interest in increasing access to television 
programming, an interest that 'is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing 
the fullest possible access to information through the public airways."104 The 
conclusions of the district court were "buttressed by the fact that to the extent time-
shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields 
societal benefits."105 The Supreme Court said this public benefit of making literary 
works more available supported an interpretation of "fair use that requires the copyright 
holder to demonstrate some likelihood of harm."106 
The dissent in Sony argued that an extension of "fair use so as to permit 
unfettered use of this new technology in order to increase access to television 
programming" risked "eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors of 
control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create."107 Yet even this 
 
103 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  The Ninth Circuit in Sony discounted access in the fair use calculation, 
noting "the statute does not list 'convenience' or 'entertainment' or 'increased access' as purposes within 
the general scope of fair use."  659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1982).  This statement was referring to the 
examples of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching…, scholarship, or research" provided in the 
first sentence of §107 as purposes that may constitute fair use. 
104 464 U.S. at 425 (Emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 454 (Emphasis added). 
106 Id. The Court was referring specifically here to "making television broadcasting more available."  
Id. Citing Sony, Fisher said, "The fair use doctrine enables the judiciary to permit unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted works in particular situations when doing so will result in wider dissemination of those works 
without seriously eroding the incentives for artistic and intellectual innovation."  Reconstructing, n. 65 
above at 1687. 
107 464 U.S. at 480-481 (Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist).  The dissent also 
said, "Copyright gives the author a right to limit or even to cut off access to his work."  Id. at 480.  While 
that is true for unpublished works, fair use is a limitation on the rights of authors.  In other words, the right 
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proprietary view of copyright by the dissent implicitly acknowledged that access was a 
factor that favored fair use, since the dissent recognized that one of the two risks of the 
copyright system was "that granting authors a copyright monopoly will reduce the 
creative ability of others because others would not have access to the works."108 The 
dissent concluded that "[w]hen the use is one that creates no benefit to the public at 
large, copyright protection should not be denied on the basis that a new technology that 
may result in harm has not yet done so."109 In other words, the dissent believed that if 
increased access benefited the public, such increased access would favor fair use. 
While both the majority and dissent considered the impact of access on 
fair use, neither suggested that access was part of the four statutory fair use factors.  
Instead, the Justices seemed to discuss access as a separate factor in determining the 
fair use balance.110 However, whether they considered access as a separate factor or a 
"sub-factor" within one of the four factors listed in §107 is not as important as the fact 
they recognized that increasing access favored a finding of fair use.   
The increased access in Sony, moreover, was only increased access to 
persons who already had some access.  It would be logical to conclude that where there 
 
to prevent access is subject to the fact that the copyright holder does not have the right to control all uses 
of their work, including the right to fair use.  Id. at 432-433.  Thus, the fair use statute begins by stating, 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A…".  Indeed, §107 now expressly provides that 
unpublished works may be the subject of fair use by third parties by the last sentence in the section:  "The 
fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors.".   
108 Id. at 479.  The dissent said the second risk was "that depriving authors of their monopoly will 
reduce their incentive to create."  Id. 
109 Id. at 482.  The dissent inferred to taping of the broadcasts on an "unproductive use."  Id. at 482. 
110 The majority discussed access at pp. 428-429, 440-441, 446 (n. 28), discussed the four statutory 
fair use factors at pp. 448-451 (it mentioned access once on p. 451) and continued discussing access at 
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had been no access previously (as with the existing Library Project and the 
contemplated Kikuyu Key), the Supreme Court would rule that the increased access 
favored fair use even more.  Although the next Court decision on fair use might appear 
to have discounted increasing access as a favorable factor, in fact the defendant in the 
next case did not increase access by its use of the original work, so the decision does 
not weaken the conclusion that increasing access favors a finding of fair use. 
D. Harper – Leaking Excerpts From an Unpublished Work the Copyright 
Holder Was About to Publish Did Not Increase Access and Was Not a 
Fair Use 
1. Background 
In the second Supreme Court fair use case, Harper & Row Publishers 
sued Nation Enterprises for publishing in The Nation unauthorized verbatim quotes from 
the then soon to-be-released memoirs of President Ford.  Time Magazine had 
contracted with Harper & Row for the exclusive right to publish excerpts from the 
memoirs before the publication of the memoirs, but The Nation had obtained a copy of 
the manuscript in spite of the efforts of Harper & Row to maintain secrecy.  After The 
Nation published excerpts, Time cancelled its agreement and refused to pay Harper & 
Row $12,500.111 The district court found that the excerpts in The Nation had infringed 
Harper & Row's copyright, but the Second Circuit held that The Nation's actions had 
 
pp. 453-454.  The dissent discussed access at pp. 480-481 and did not really focus on §107 until pp. 482-
486. 
111 471 U.S. at 543.  Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice 
Barger and Justices Blackman, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens.  Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting 
opinion and was joined by Justices White and Marshall.   
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been a fair use.112 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the 
publication of the excerpts was not a fair use.   
2. The statutory fair use factors113 
Prior to the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, fair use generally had 
not even been a defense to a claim of copyright infringement of an unpublished work.114 
The Court in Harper recognized, however, that the 1976 Copyright Act for the first time 
gave a copyright owner a federal right to control the first publication of her work and that 
 
112 Id. at 544-545.  Different views of copyright are apparent in the two decisions of the lower courts.  
The district court seemed to look at the excerpts in The Nation as a whole and the Ford memoirs as the 
property of Harper & Row.  The district court said, "The Nation certainly had no interest in presenting 
these historical facts and memoranda in isolation.  Rather, it is the totality of those facts and memoranda 
collected together with Ford's reflections that made them of value to The Nation.  Correspondingly, it is 
the same totality that is protected by the copyright laws."  557 F.Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).  In 
contrast, the Second Circuit directed more attention to the uncopyrightable parts and seemed to view 
copyright as a regulatory mechanism balancing (a) incentives to create works with (2) the interest of 
others to reproduce parts of such works.  The Second Circuit said, "Where information concerning 
important matters of state is accompanied by a minimal borrowing of expression, the economic impact of 
which is dubious at best, the copyright holder's monopoly must not be permitted to prevail over a 
journalist's communications."  723 F.2d 195, 208 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
113 On the purpose and character of the use, the majority said the significance of the profit/non-profit 
question was not motive, "but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted 
material without paying the customary price."  Id. at 562.  The use of "customary price" suggests an 
established, common price in the market.  The majority said, "Also relevant to the 'character' of the use is 
'the propriety of the defendant's conduct' ….  The trial court found that The Nation knowingly exploited a 
purloined manuscript."  Id. The listing of "news reporting" as a possible fair use in §107 did not create a 
presumption of fair use for news reporting, but was only an example to "give some ideas of the sort of 
activities the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances."  Id. at 561, quoting from the 
applicable Senate Report.  The majority also said that whether "an article arguably is 'news' and therefore 
a productive use is simply one factor in a fair use analysis."  Id.  The majority did not explain there what it 
considered to be a "productive use."  On the issue of "productive use," see L.G. Lape, "Transforming Fair 
Use:  The Productive Use Factor In Fair Use Doctrine," 58 Alb. L. Rev. 677 (1995); and 4 Nimmer on 
Copyright §13.05[A][1][b] (n. 7 above).  The dissent said the purpose of the Nation's article was news 
reporting that "strongly favors a finding of fair use."  Id at 591.  The dissent also argued that the majority's 
"reliance on the Nation's putative bad faith is equally unwarranted."  Id. at 593.   
114 471 U.S. at 550-551.  Prior to the 1976 Act, only the common law protected authors from the 
unauthorized copying of their unpublished works.  Id. at 551.   
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the right of first publication was expressly made subject to the fair use provision of 
§107.115 
With respect to the nature of the copyrighted work, the Court rejected the 
idea that the Copyright Act of 1976 treated identically the copying and public distribution 
of (1) a previously unpublished work and (2) a previously published work, saying "fair 
use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case."116 The Court had noted 
earlier in its decision that "where an author and publisher have invested extensive 
resources and created an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no 
legitimate aim is served by pre-empting the right of first publication."117 The Court 
concluded the "fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of its 'nature'" and 
 
115 Id. at 551-552.  As a result of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §106(3) gives a copyright 
holder the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."  P.L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546.  House 
Report No. 94-1476 explained that this provision "establishes the exclusive right of publication….  Under 
this provision the copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of an 
authorized copy or phonorecord of his work….  Likewise, any unauthorized public distribution of copies or 
phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be an infringement….however, the copyright owner's 
rights under section 106(3) cease with respect to a particular copy or phonorecord once he has parted 
with ownership of it."  5 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 94th Congress, Second 
Session, 1976, pp. 5675-5676.  17 U.S.C. §301 pre-empts common law copyright claims.  See House 
Report No. 94-1476 ("The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common 
law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the 
scope of the Federal copyright law.")  5 US Code Cong. Adm. News 1976, p. 5746. 
116 Id. at 552.  The Court restated the general principle that factual works receive less protection 
under copyright law than works of fiction and that the Ford memoirs were a "historical narrative," but that 
this still favored a finding of infringement.  471 U.S. at 563. 
117 Id. at 557.  In Rights Management Systems, n. 65 above, at p. 43, D. Burke and J. Cohen say 
that in Harper & Row, the Court "identified fair use as a type of 'safety valve' that mediates between the 
strictures of copyright and the demands of the First Amendment," citing 471 U.S. at 560.  What the Court 
said at 560 was, "Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first 
publication in particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value" (the right to speak and the right 
to refrain from speaking).  The majority added, "In view of the First Amendment protections already 
embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts 
and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no 
warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to 
copyright."  Id. The majority rejected the argument of The Nation that "First Amendment values require a 
different rule" for balancing the rights of the copyright holder against a claim of fair use.  Id. at 555. 
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that the "right of first publication encompasses not only the choice of whether to publish 
at all, but also the choices of when, where and in what form first to publish the work."118 
The Court addressed the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
and held "a taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to 
the infringing work."119 The Court also observed that the district court had found that 
The Nation had copied "what was essentially the heart of the book."120 It was this 
"expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in the infringing work" that made this 
factor favor infringement, even though the number of words taken may have been 
small.121 
The Court said that the effect on the market – both for the original work 
and derivative works – was "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
 
118 Id. at 564.  The dissent argued that the majority's position improperly considered economic loss 
of the copyright holder as part of the second factor.  Id. at 598.  In 1992, subsequent to the decision in 
Harper, Congress amended the fair use statute by adding the following sentence at the end of §107: "The 
fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors."  PL 102-492 106 Stat. 3145.  House Report 102-836, 5 U.S. Code 
Congressional and Administrative News, 102nd Congress, Second Session (1992), p. 2561, said the 
purpose of the addition was not to change the principles set forth in Harper, but "to reiterate Congress's 
intention in codifying fair use that in evaluating a claim of fair use, including claims involving unpublished 
works, the courts are to examine all four statutory factors set forth in Section 107, as well as any other 
factor deemed relevant in the court's discretion."  The House Report also suggested that the fact a work 
was unpublished might not mean fewer uses of unpublished works would be fair use, but would likely 
mean the amount of protected material that may be copied from an unpublished work would be less than 
the amount of protected material that may be copied from a published work.  Id. at pp. 2560-2561.  
119 Id. at 565.  The Court noted, however, that the approximately 300 words taken verbatim from the 
memoirs were at least 13% of the infringing article.  Id. at 565.  There was a dispute over how much more 
of protected parts of the memoirs may have been copied.  See e.g., Id. at 565, n. 8.  The dissent did not 
disagree with the principle quoted above, but disagreed that "the substantiality of the expression taken 
was clearly excessive or inappropriate to the Nation's news reporting purpose."  Id. at 601.   
120 Id. at 564-565, quoting from 557 F.Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).  The Second Circuit 
reversed the decision of the district court at 723 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1983).  The quoted material addressed 
President Ford's pardon of former President Nixon.  See 557 F. Supp. at 1069, 1072, and Appendix A. 
121 471 U.S. at 566. 
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use."122 Once a plaintiff shows a causal connection between an infringement and actual 
loss of revenue, "the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this damage 
would have occurred had there been no taking of copyrighted expression."123 Of 
course, Harper & Row had shown actual damages (the loss of the income from Time 
Magazine), so the Court did not have to address the importance of this factor when 
plaintiff had not proven actual damage was not an issue.   
3. Access 
Meaningful access (or lack thereof) was clearly a factor to the Court in 
Harper, since the Court distinguished between fair use of "out of print" books and fair 
use of unpublished works.124 Quoting from the Senate Report, the Court said, "If the 
work is 'out of print' and unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the user 
may have more justification for reproducing it."125 The Court indicated that more 
favorable copyright protection for unpublished works than for out of print works made 
sense, since "not being published is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the 
 
122 Id. at 566, citing 3 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A] at 13-76.  Without expressly adopting it, in a 
footnote Justice O'Connor summarized the market failure approach to fair use:  "Economists who have 
addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should come into play only in those situations in which 
the market fails or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero."  471 U.S. at 566, n. 9.  If the 
copyright holder would ask a price near zero, the market failure approach would conclude it was not worth 
the transaction costs involved to obtain permission, so the use could be fair use.  Justice O'Connor 
continued, "As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that encourages the creation 
and dissemination of memoirs of public figures."  Id. In fact the relevant market for purposes of fair use 
would have been not the market for memoirs, but for pre-publication releases of excerpts from books, 
including memoirs.  However, the fact that Time had paid Harper & Row for rights to release excerpts 
from the Ford memoirs before publication showed there was a market for pre-publication releases.  
Justice O'Connor concluded by saying that "[i]n the economists' view, permitting 'fair use' to displace 
normal copyright channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public benefit."  Id. 
123 Id. at 567. 
124 As in Sony, the Court in Harper discussed the question of lack of access (in Harper, out of print 
books) at 553, largely outside of its consideration of the four statutory fair use factors, which four factors 
the Court discussed at 563-568.  See note 110 above concerning Sony.
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copyright owner," whereas the copyright holder may not have planned to be out of 
print.126 
The Court, however, rejected the Nation's argument that it was promoting 
the public interest by increasing access to works.  The Court said "[a]ny copyright 
infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to the copyrighted 
work."127 Yet all that means is a court should not accept every claim of increasing 
access as favoring fair use.   
Assume a copyright holder produces 100,000 copies of a book and 
another company (the pirate) – seeing that the book is selling well – makes 500,000 
copies of that book and sells them to the public before the original publisher can 
produce additional copies.  The pirate's actions would not increase the number of books 
available to the public, because the original publisher probably would have produced 
the additional copies for the public.  Similarly, in Harper, The Nation had not increased 
access to parts of President Ford's memoirs, but had simply sped up that access.  That 
is significantly different than creating a work that the copyright holder could not produce 
and that consumers would not otherwise be able to access.  The next Supreme Court 
decision on fair use also did not involve a situation in which the defendant was providing 
access to a type of work that a segment of the public had not had access before. 
 
125 Id. at 553. 
126 Id.  
127 471 U.S. at 569. 
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E. Stewart – An Established Market for the Type of Derivative Works at 
Issue Can Defeat a Finding of Fair Use 
 
1. Background and statutory fair use factors 
In the third Supreme Court fair use case, Stewart v. Abend, Alfred 
Hitchcock's "Rear Window" was the challenged work.128 Although at the time of the 
initial production of "Rear Window," the producers had a license from the copyright 
holder of the original story, "It Had To Be Murder," for the creation/distribution of a 
derivative work, that license lapsed upon the death of the copyright holder.129 Then, 
without the permission of the copyright holder (at this point the estate of the original 
copyright holder), the producers caused the re-broadcast of Rear Window on television, 
and the holder of the copyright renewal term in "It Had To Be Murder" sued the 
producers of "Rear Window."130 The re-release of Rear Window of course was a 
commercial venture, since the defendants had received twelve million dollars for that re-
release.131 
128 495 U.S. 207 (1995).  The dissent by Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia 
took the position that the respective rights of the parties were determined by the Copyright Act of 1909, 
the statute in effect when the work had been created, so this article does not discuss the dissent.  Id. at 
239, n. 1.  The majority opinion of Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Kennedy held 
that under either the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act, "the owner of the pre-existing work possessed the right to 
sue for infringement even after the incorporation of the pre-existing work in the derivative work."  Id. at 
226.   
129 Id. at 211-212. 
130 495 U.S. at 213.  There are no longer copyright renewal rights for new copyrights.  3 Nimmer on 
Copyright at §§9.02 and 9.07 (n. 7 above).  The Supreme Court's opinion focused mainly on the 
argument of the owners of "Rear Window" that "the rights of the owner of the copyright in the derivative 
use of the preexisting work are extinguished once it is incorporated into the derivative work, assuming the 
author of the pre-existing work has agreed to assign his renewal rights."  495 U.S. at 216.  The owners of 
"Rear Window" also argued that argued that even if the use of the original work to create a derivative 
work had been unauthorized (which the Supreme Court concluded it was), the use was a fair use. 
131 Id. at 237.  The work in question was fictional, so it was less likely than a factual work to be 
deemed a fair use.  Also, although the original story quantitatively constituted only 20% of the motion 
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The Court again said that the fourth factor was the "most important, and 
indeed central fair use factor" and concluded that the record supported the conclusion 
that re-release of "Rear Window" harmed the ability to market a new version of the story 
"It Had To Be Murder."132 There was no need to discuss the needed quantum of proof 
concerning harm to a market, since counsel for the defendants had conceded at oral 
argument in the Ninth Circuit that "Abend's plans for a remake were frustrated by the 
existence of the 'Rear Window' film."133 
2. Access 
The Court in Stewart recognized that access was a fundamental 
consideration in copyright law, saying that "although dissemination of creative works is a 
goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist's right to control 
the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public's need for access to 
creative works."134 In Stewart, however, there was no lack of public access to the type 
of derivative work at issue.  The defendants had interfered with the copyright owner’s 
attempt to market to HBO a derivative work of "It Had To Be Murder," had distributed 
"Rear Window" itself in 1954 and then had "Rear Window" broadcast on ABC television 
in 1971.135 In contrast to Stewart, the fourth Supreme Court fair use decision, 
 
picture story-line, the Court noted that the motion picture used the story's unique setting, characters, plot 
and sequence of events, and that was qualitatively sufficient for infringement.  Id. at 237-238. 
132 Id. Citing 3 Nimmer On Copyright, §13.05[A] at 13-81. 
133 863 F.2d 1465, 1482 (9th Cir. 1988). 
134 495 U.S. at 228. 
135 495 U.S. at 212-213.  See also n. 133 above.  The Stewart in this case was the famous actor 
Jimmy Stewart, who with Alfred Hitchcock had formed a production company, Patron, Inc., to produce 
and distribute "Rear Window."  Id. at 212. 
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discussed next, did address a situation in which the public would not have had access 
to a type of derivative work but for the actions of the defendants. 
F. Campbell – Transformative Works of a Type That the Copyright 
Holder Would Not Prepare Favor Fair Use 
1. Background 
The fourth case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. established that 
when the third party gave the public a different type of work than had previously been 
available, a "transformative work," such work was likely to be a fair use.  2 Live Crew 
had written a parody, "Pretty Woman," of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman" and 
told Acuff-Rose that they had written the parody. 136 2 Live Crew offered to pay Acuff-
Rose a fee for the use of "Oh, Pretty Woman" and to give credit to Acuff-Rose and the 
original authors.  Acuff-Rose refused to give permission and sued.137 
2. The statutory fair use factors 
A unanimous Court discussed "transformative use" in its analyses of the 
first, third and fourth statutory fair use factors.138 For the first factor, the Court said that 
 
136 Justice Souter wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, and Justice Kennedy filed a concurring 
opinion.  Roy Orbison and William Dees had written the rock ballad "Oh Pretty Woman" and assigned 
their rights to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.   
137 510 U.S. at 572.  The district court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew.  754 F.Supp. 
1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).  The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that 2 Live Crew's "blatantly commercial 
purpose … prevents this parody from being a fair use."  972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992); and Id. at 
574.  The Supreme Court reversed and noted that 2 Live Crew's request for permission did "not 
necessarily suggest that they believed their version was not fair use; the offer may singly have been 
made in a good-faith effort to avoid this litigation."  Id. at 585, n. 18.  The Court added, "being denied 
permission to use a work does not weigh against a finding of fair use."  Id. 
138 510 U.S. at 578-583, 588 and 591.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy said, “As future 
courts apply our fair use analysis, they must take care to ensure that not just any commercial takeoff is 
rationalized post hoc as a parody.”  Id. at 600.  Although the Court had said in Sony that "every 
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively . . . unfair," the Court explained in Campbell that 
this was not a "hard evidentiary presumption."  Id. at 584.  The Court added that Sony simply stood for the 
proposition that the existence of a commercial was simply one factor that tended to weigh against a 
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the important issue was whether the new work simply superseded the objects of the 
original work or added something new, "with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning or message; it asks, in other words, 
whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative.'"139 The Court said that the 
goal of copyright law to promote science and arts was "generally furthered by the 
creation of transformative works."140 
The Court discussed the role parody plays in the fourth statutory fair use 
factor, but did not repeat its previous statements that the fourth statutory factor was the 
most important factor.141 It acknowledged that a parody may harm the market for the 
original work, but explained that "when a lethal parody, like a scathing theatre review, 
 
finding of fair use.  Id. at 585.  The Court noted that the illustrations of possible fair use in §107, such as 
news reporting and teaching were commercial endeavors, but that fact did not preclude findings of fair 
use.  Determining fair use was not a process "to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the 
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis."  Id. at 577. 
139 Id. at 579. 
140 Id. The Court drew a distinction between parody, which needed to mimic (copy) an original to 
make its point and satire, which the Court said could "stand on its own two feet."  Id. at 580-581.  The 
Court said that the threshold question for a parody raising fair use as a defense was "whether a parodic 
character may reasonably be perceived," and that whether the parody was in bad taste or good taste did 
not matter for purpose of determining fair use.  Id. at 582.  The Court agreed that fair use was more 
difficult to establish with works at the "core of intended copyright protection" (such as fictional works) and 
that "Oh, Pretty Woman" fell within that core.  Id. at 586.  However, that fact might never "help much in 
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably 
copy publicly known, expressive works."  Id.  With respect to the third factor, the Court said that once 
"enough has been taken to assure identification, how much more is reasonable will depend, say, on the 
extent to which the song's overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the 
likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original."  Id. at 588. 
141 As a result, one court has concluded that the Supreme Court has abandoned the idea that the 
fourth factor is the most important fair use factor.  American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 926 (9th Cir. 1995) ("apparently abandoning the idea that any factor enjoys primacy, Campbell 
instructs" that all four factors "'are to be explored and the results weigh together, in light of the purposes 
of copyright.'"  Another court was not sure the Supreme Court no longer considered the fourth factor the 
most important factor.  Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1385-1386 (6th Cir. 1996) ("We take it that this factor … is at least primus inter pares, figuratively 
speaking, and we shall turn to it first").  Emphasizing a different factor, Leval argued that "Factor One is 
the soul of fair use."  P.N. Leval, "Toward A Fair Use Standard," 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1116 (March 
1990) (hereafter "Fair Use Standard"). 
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kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright 
Act."142 Although the Court recognized that fair use must take into account not only 
harm to the original work, but harm to the market for derivative works, it added that the 
"market for potential derivative uses include only those that creators of original works 
would in general develop or license others to develop."143 In other words, certain 
economic harm – whether actual or potential – does not factor into the fair use balance. 
3. Access 
Although not expressly discussing "access," the Court's conclusion that 
certain transformative works favored a finding of fair use has the same effect as 
recognizing that a defendant's creation of certain types of literary works to which the 
public would not otherwise have had access favors a finding of fair use.  The Court said 
"the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or 
lampoons of their own productions removes such user from the very notion of a 
potential licensing market."144 The Court explained that the "market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general 
develop or license for others."145 Put another way, if a copyright holder would not 
produce or license a certain type of derivative work, creation by a third party of that type 
 
142 Id. at 591-592. 
143 Id. at 592.  At 590, the Court stated, "Since fair use is an affirmative defense," citing Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 561, "its proponents would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use 
without favorable evidence about relevant markets."  However, the Court also said that "[n]o 'presumption' 
or inference of market harm … is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplication for 
commercial purposes."  Id. at 591.   
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of derivative work, such as a parody, would create access to literary works that the 
public would not otherwise have access to and would favor a finding of fair use.146 
G. Initial Application of Fair Use Factors to the Library Project 
and Kikuyu Key 
 
1. Four statutory fair use factors 
The application of the four statutory fair use factors to the Library Project 
and the Kikuyu Key reveals some of those factors favoring a finding of fair use and 
some favoring a finding of infringement.  Consider the Library Project first and just how 
a consumer would use the Library Project (column 3 below), disregarding temporarily 
the copying of the books necessary to create the Google Database. 
Google is a for-profit corporation that earns millions of dollars from 
advertising placed on its web pages, and the Library Project is part of Google's allure for 
users, which in turn is an enticement for advertisers.  As a result, the Library Project has 
a commercial character not favoring fair use.147 However, for the second part of the first 
fair use factor, the end result will be a massive electronic database, a "work" 
significantly different in content and purpose than each individual book, and this would 
 
146 Lower court cases have confirmed that the allegedly harmed market for derivative works must not 
be a hypothetical one.  For instance in Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Second Circuit said, 
"Leibovitz has not identified any market for a derivative work that might be harmed by the Paramount ad.  
In these circumstances, the defendant had no obligation to present evidence showing lack of harm in a 
market for derivative works."  137 F.3d 109, 116, n. 6 (2nd Cir. 1998).  In Sony Computer Entertainment 
America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, the Ninth Circuit held that Bleem's use of screen shots from Sony's video 
games to advertise  Bleem's "software emulator" was a fair use.  214 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000).  
The software emulator allowed consumers to play Sony video games on PC's instead of the Sony 
PlayStation.  Id. at 1024.  The Ninth Circuit said, "Certainly screen shots are a standard device used in 
the industry to demonstrate video game graphics, but there is not a market for them, or at least not one in 
which Bleem may participate given Sony's refusal to license to it."  Id. at 1029. 
147 Harper, 471 U.S. at 562 ("The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is … whether the user stands 
to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price"); and 4 Nimmer 
on Copyright at §13.05[A][1][c] (n. 7 above) ("'Commercial uses' are extremely broad"). 
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be a transformative result favoring fair use.148 The Library Project involves both novels 
(at the core of copyright protection) and scientific texts, so the second fair use factor 
favors a finding of infringement.149 Since the consumer only sees minor portions of the 
results of each search, the amount and substantiality of portion copied should favor fair 
use.150 The fourth fair use factor should also favor a finding of fair use, since no 
copyright holder has the ability to create the database on its own, and presumably there 
is no existing market for the licensing of books for use in such a database and thus 
could be no demonstrable adverse effect on the market.151 In light of the special 
favorable weight the Supreme Court gave to transformative works in Campbell, and 
without considering the interim copying of the complete works, the table below shows 
that a court should conclude the Library Product is a fair use: 








What Google user views 





 a. Commercial - favors 
copyright holders. 
b.  transformative—favors 
Google 
2.  Nature of 
copyrighted 
work 
 Favors copyright holders 
3.  Amount 
and 
 Minor parts shown to 
viewer, generally not 
148 See text accompanying notes 138-143 above. 
149 If only factual texts were copied for the Google Database this factor might favor less strongly a 
finding of infringement, but this factor would nevertheless favor a finding of infringement.  See n. 116 
above. 
150 See, in contrast, the text accompanying notes 119-121 above. 
151 See the text accompanying notes 100 and 101 above and n. 146 above. 
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 Realistically copyright 
holder could not create the 
market (but could license 
individual book titles) -- 
favors Google 
If, however, a court separately analyzed the interim copying (columns 1 
and 2 in the table below), and without considering the value of increasing access to 
literary works, a court could conclude that there was infringement: 
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b.  transformative—favors 
Google 








Favors copyright holders 
3.  Amount 
and 
substantiality 








Minor parts shown to 





©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 








What Google user views 











holder could not create the 
market (but could license 
individual book titles) -- 
favors Google 
An initial examination of the Kikuyu Key leads to a similarly ambiguous 
result, especially when not considering the value of increasing access to literary works.  
The first part of the fair use factor should favor a finding of fair use, since the 
translations would be prepared by nonprofit corporations without financial gain.  
However, 17 U.S.C. §101 expressly includes translations as derivative works, and 17 
U.S.C. §106(2) expressly gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make 
derivative works, so the purpose of the Kikuyu Key – to provide derivative works – could 
favor a finding of infringement.  The second and third fair use factors would favor a 
finding of infringement, because a variety of books would be involved, and all of the 
contents of the books would be copied, albeit in another language.  For the fourth factor, 
the publishers have not found a market yet for licensing books to be translated into 
Kikuyu or other native languages of citizens in developing countries.  However, the 
publishers presumably would be willing to license the right to translate and publish 
works in Kikuyu, and presumably there would be a market for translations into some 
language, so it is not clear how a court would evaluate the fourth factor:152 
152 This raises the issue of what constitutes the licensing market, the market for translation into any 
language other than English or a market for translating only into Kikuyu?  See Campbell, n. 137 above, 
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Kikuyu Key 
1.  Character and purpose 
of allegedly infringing use 
a.  Non-commercial—favors Kikuyu Key. 
b.  Translations are one of the express rights authors 
have, so arguably the purpose could favor the 
copyright holders. 
2.  Nature of copyrighted 
work 
Favors copyright holders 
3.  Amount and 
substantiality of portion of 
copyrighted work copied 
Favors copyright holders 
4.  Effect on markets for 
copyrighted work and 
derivatives 
No realistic possibility that for-profit publishers would 
translate works into Kikuyu,  but publishers would be 
willing to license the right to translate and publish in 
Kikuyu to someone willing to translate. 
Yet this does not end the analysis.  A lower court should recognize that 
increasing access should favor a finding of fair use, and the next section restates that 
point. 
2. Increasing access is an additional factor favoring a finding of fair 
use 
The Supreme Court has not limited itself to the four factors listed in §107 
in determining if a challenged use of a copyright work is a fair use.  In Sony, the Court 
expressly held that increasing access to literary works favored fair use.153 In Campbell,
the Court gave significant weight to the probability that the copyright holder of the 
original work would neither produce the type of derivative work created by the defendant 
 
510 U.S. at 591-592 ("market for potential derivative uses include only those that creators of original 
works would in general develop or license others to develop"), and n. 146 above.  Could publishers 
seriously suggest they expected to translate their works into Kikuyu?  For a critique of taking into account 
licensing systems in the fair use analysis, see L.P. Loren, "Redefining The Market Failure Approach To 
Fair Use In An Era Of Copyright Permission Systems," 5 J. Intellectual Property Law 1, 38 (Fall 1997) 
("Restricting fair use to only those situations where an efficient mechanism for obtaining permission does 
not yet exist trivializes the importance of fair use in a democratic society and the importance of fair use in 
furthering the goals of copyright law").  See also discussion at IV.C. below. 
153 §II.C.3. above. 
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nor license the defendant to develop the type of derivative work.154 In other words, the 
public would never have had access to the parody involved in Campbell but for the 
finding of fair use.  Therefore, it is not sufficient to consider only the four statutory fair 
use factors where the third party's use will increase access to literary works to which 
consumers would not otherwise have had access.155 
Recognizing that increasing access favors fair use does not end the 
purpose of this article, however.  There needs to be more analysis in order to answer 
whether the Library Project is a fair use or the Kikuyu Key would be a fair use.  Part III 
provides that analysis for the Library Project with respect to interim copying of works, 
and Part IV provides that analysis for the Kikuyu Key with respect to translations. 
 
154 §II.F.3. above.  Generally two works  derivative of the same original work – one by the copyright 
owner and one by a third party – would not be identical to each other, but the third party could not 
necessarily use those differences to support a finding of fair use for the work created by the third party on 
the grounds that it would provide access to the public of a different work.  The work by the third party 
should be a different type of derivative work than the author of the original work would prepare in order to 
favor fair use.  In other words, a third party should not be allowed to create the next Mission Impossible 
movie simply because it is different from the original Mission Impossible.
155 Increasing access is not the only additional factor the Supreme Court has considered.  For 
instance, in Harper, the Court considered the propriety of defendant's conduct and whether the original 
work had previously been published or not as factors in a finding of infringement and no fair use.  See n. 
113 above.  In contrast, Leval has argued that the four statutory factors are the only valid factors.  See 
Fair Use Standard, n. 141 above, at p. 1125 ("The more that I have studied the question, the more I have 
come to conclude that the pertinent factors are those named in the statute.  Additional considerations that 
I and others have looked to are false factors that direct the inquiry from the goals of copyright").  
However, to try to shoehorn all considerations into the four specified categories in §107 seems to 
confuse, rather than clarify, fair use analysis. 
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III. IN SPITE OF THE INTERIM COPYING, PROVIDING ACCESS TO A DIGITAL 
DATABASE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE AVAILABLE TO THE 
PUBLIC MAKES THE LIBRARY PROJECT A FAIR USE 
A. The Importance of Increasing Access Can Justify Making 
Complete Interim Copies of Copyrighted Works  
Some scholars argue that the market system will generally result in 
appropriate payment for and distribution to the public of copyrighted works.156 For 
instance, Gordon has argued that "[o]nly where the desired transfer of resource use 
[granting the right to copy a copyrighted work in whole or part] is unlikely to take place 
spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as market flaws impair the 
market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how resources should be allocated, is 
there an economic need for allowing nonconsensual transfer."157 A classic example of 
the need for fair use under this economic model is when the costs of obtaining consent 
for the use would be "so high relative to the benefits that no such exchange is feasible 
between a user of a copyrighted work and its owner."158 
Yet even scholars who are proponents of the economic model recognize 
that other factors than technical market failures or purely economic ones can justify the 
need for the fair use doctrine.159 An example of such other factor is when the copyright 
 
156 See, e.g., Market Failure, n. 65 above. 
157 See Market Failure, n. 65 above at 1615.  Gordon argues that "[f]air use should be awarded to 
the defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use 
to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the 
incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner."  Id. at 1614.  As one example, Gordon suggests that "out-of-
print status of a copyrighted work may help to justify fair use….markets cannot form where goods are 
unavailable."  Id. at 1627-1628.   
158 Economic Analysis, n. 19 above, at 357-358.  See also Market Failure, n. 65 above at 1627-1630. 
159 Economic Analysis, n. 19 above at 357 ("Our economic model, however, explains the major 
applications of the fair use principle"). 
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holder has the anti-dissemination motive of preventing competition.160 In such 
situations, discussed below, considerations of access have played key roles in findings 
of fair use. 
1. scanning a work and then changing it slightly in the ultimate work 
Arriba 
Arriba Soft Corp. operated a visual search engine that displayed on the 
Internet search results from consumer queries as "thumbnail" pictures.  Arriba had 
obtained the pictures by copying images from other websites and then using "these 
copies to generate smaller, lower-resolution thumbnails of the images.  Once the 
thumbnails are created, the program deletes the full-sized originals from the server."161 
Kelly's images were among thousands of images that Arriba displayed through its 
search engine database.162 Kelly sued Arriba for copyright infringement.163 
The Ninth Circuit in Arriba held that the display of the thumbnail images by 
Arriba constituted a fair use.  The court said that fair use "permits courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity 
which that law is designed to foster."164 The court said that Arriba's use of the images 
 
160 Market Failure, n. 65 above at 1632-1635.  Of course, one could call any factor justifying fair use 
a "market failure," but anti-dissemination motives have nothing to do with the actual structure of the 
market. 
161 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).  The court later added that "[a]nyone 
who downloaded the thumbnails would not be successful selling full-sized images enlarged from the 
thumbnails because of the low resolution of the thumbnails.  There would be no way to view, create, or 
sell a clear, full-sized image when going to Kelly's web sites."  Id. at 822. 
162 Id. at 818. 
163 Id. at 815. 
164 Id. at 817, n.11, quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394, 
1399 (9th Cir. 1997).  Dr. Seuss involved a poem about the O.J. Simpson double murder trial that was 
written in the style of Dr. Seuss and titled "The Cat NOT in the Hat!  A Parody by Dr. Juice."  Id. at 1396  
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was transformative, favoring fair use, since Kelly's images were artistic works "to 
engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience," whereas Arriba's use was unrelated to 
any aesthetic purpose but was instead a tool to help index and approve access to 
images on the Internet.165 
Addressing the amount and substantiality of the portion used in Arriba, the 
court said the "extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of 
the use."166 The court concluded that this factor did not weigh in favor of or against the 
finding of fair use, "because, although Arriba did copy each of Kelly's images as a 
whole, it was reasonable to do so in light of Arriba's use of the images."167 
The Ninth Circuit held that the fourth factor favored Arriba, concluding that 
"Arriba's creation and use of the thumbnails does not harm the market for or value of 
Kelly's images."168 The court did not expressly discuss the possibility of Kelly 
developing similar derivative works as Arriba or the possible effect Arriba's displaying of 
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against Penguin Books on 
copyright infringement in large part because Penguin Books was not holding the distinctive style of 
Dr. Seuss up to ridicule, but was using the title and style to get attention.  The court in Dr. Seuss also 
noted that the defendants had not presented "evidence about relevant markets," and that the "good will 
and reputation associated with Dr. Seuss' works is substantial."  109 F.3d at 1400-1401.  Of course 
Dr. Seuss involved a derivative work that was a commercial use.  A distinction between Dr. Seuss and 
Campbell is that the Ninth Circuit concluded The Cat NOT in the Hat was not a true parody – holding the 
original work up to ridicule, whereas "Pretty Woman" was trying to ridicule "Oh Pretty Woman." 
165 336 F.3d at 818.  Although the use of the thumbnail images was commercial, the court concluded 
that Arriba was not using Kelly's images to directly promote its website and was not trying to make money 
by selling Arriba's images, so "the commercial nature of the use weighs only slightly against a finding of 
fair use.".  Id. Although the Ninth Circuit said that the second factor favored Kelly slightly, the court added 
that published works are more likely to qualify as fair use, because the artist's expression has already 
appeared.  Id. at 820. 
166 Id. at 820. 
167 Id. at 821.  For another discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see A. Olson, "Why Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003), Does and Doesn't Matter," 44 Jurimetrics J. 487 (Summer 
2004). 
168 Id. at 822. 
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the thumbnail images might have on the market for derivative works, but noted that 
"Arriba does not sell or license its thumbnails to other parties."169 The court concluded 
Arriba's use of the thumbnail images was a fair use.   
Bill Graham Archives 
In a 2006 decision, Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,170 the 
Second Circuit held that copying of complete pictorial works was not copyright 
infringement but a fair use, where the copies were modified slightly and put into a larger 
work.  The challenged work was a 480 page book by Dorling Kindersley – Grateful 
Dead: The Illustrated Trip – that included copies of artistic concert posters copied and 
reduced in size by the book publishers and placed in the book.  The court said a typical 
page in the book had a collage of images, text and graphic art.  Plaintiff Bill Graham 
Archives claimed copyright ownership of seven of the over 2,000 images in the book.171 
169 Id. at 821.  In contrast, see Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (C.D. Calif. 
2006) ("Google's use of thumbnails likely does harm the potential market for the downloading of P10's 
reduced-size images onto cell phones").  Perfect 10 involved a copyright challenge to (a) Google's use of 
thumbnail images copied by Google's web crawlers from other web sites and (b) Google's in-line linking to 
other websites, so that when the user clicked on the link, he saw a display from the other website's 
server.  The court concluded that in-line linking did not constitute a display or distribution by Google, so 
did not constitute copyright infringement.  However, the court said that the creation and display of the 
thumbnails by Google did infringe P10's copyrights in the images.  Id. at 838-845.  The court also 
concluded that the display of the thumbnails probably did not constitute a fair use, so the court issued a 
preliminary injunction, "despite the enormous public benefit that search engines such as Google provide."  
Id. at 851.  The court found that "Google's use of thumbnails to simplify and expedite access to 
information is transformative of P10's use of reduced-size images to entertain."  Id. at 849.  It was Perfect 
10's licensing of thumbnail images to cell phone operators after the litigation had commenced that caused 
the court to conclude that the first and fourth factors weighed against Google and that there was 
infringement.  Id. at 849 and 851.  This seems to be an unduly limiting interpretation of the fourth fair use 
factor.  See §IV.C. below.  However, unlike the Google Database, the final products in Perfect 10 were 
substantially similar to the original, so the conclusion of infringement in Perfect 10 should not be 
applicable to the Google Litigation.  Also, since the Kikuyu Key assumes a nonprofit entity will create the 
translations, the decision in Perfect 10, involving a for profit entity would not warrant a finding of 
infringement with respect to the Kikuyu Key. 
170 448 F.3d 605 (2nd Cir. 2006). 
171 Id. at 607. 
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Dorling Kindersley unsuccessfully had sought permission from Bill Graham Archives to 
reproduce the images, but Dorling Kindersley nevertheless published the book. 172 The 
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed on the ground that Dorling Kindersley's reproduction of the images was a fair 
use.173 
The Second Circuit in Graham said the overall test for fair use was 
whether allowing or preventing the use would further the progress of science and useful 
arts.174 In considering the first three fair use factors, the court focused on the 
"transformative purpose" of the poster copies in the book.  Originally the copyright 
holders had used the posters as expressive advertisements for an upcoming concert, 
but the defendants had used the copied images in the book as part of an historic 
timeline.175 The court noted the fact that defendant "significantly reduced the size of the 
reproductions and thus their expressive value."176 Although the defendant had copied 
complete images, the court concluded the images constituted "an inconsequential 
 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 607. 
174 Id. at 608, citing Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carroll Publishing Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 
(2nd Cir. 1998).  In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit affirmed a finding of copyright infringement for 
defendants' publication of a book containing trivia questions about a copyrighted television series. 
175 The court said the original purpose of the poster was "to generate public interest in the Grateful 
Dead and to convey information to a large number [of] people about the band's forthcoming concerts."  Id. 
at 609.  The court said Dorling Kindersley used the same pictures in the book as historical artifacts to 
document and represent the actual occurrence of Grateful Dead concert events featured on Illustrated 
Trip's timeline."  Id. 
176 Id. at 611.  The court said the reduced size was "inadequate to offer more than a glimpse of their 
expressive value…. DK used the minimal image size necessary to accomplish its transformative 
purpose."  Id. 
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portion" of the book, and noted that defendant had not used any of the images in 
question in its commercial advertising.177 
On the fourth factor, the Second Circuit in Graham agreed that lost 
licensing revenue from a derivative market could be part of the consideration, but added 
that "a publisher's willingness to pay license fees for reproduction of images does not 
establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative, make fair use of those images."  
The court pointed out that a copyright holder could license any use or copying of the 
copyrighted work, so if any lost licensing revenue was relevant, the fourth fair use factor 
would always favor a finding of infringement.178 
The key to Arriba and Bill Graham Archives 
In both Arriba and Graham the courts analyzed as a factor favoring a 
finding of fair use the benefit to the public of providing the public with a transformative 
use.179 In both the plaintiffs had held copyrights to only a small proportion of the 
copyrighted works the defendant had used, so the individual plaintiffs – using only their 
 
177 Id. at 611-612.  The use of the images was "tailored to further its transformative purpose because 
DK's reduced size reproductions of BGA's images in their entirety displayed the minimal image size and 
quality necessary to ensure the reader's recognition of the images as historical artifacts of Grateful Dead 
concert events."  Id. at 613.  Although the court agreed that the second factor favored the copyright 
holder, it did not put much weight in this factor.  It said, "we hold that even though BGA's images are 
creative works, which are a core concern of copyright protection, the second factor has limited weight in 
our analysis because the purpose of DK's use was to emphasize the images' historical rather than 
creative value."  Id. at 612-613.  With respect to the third factor, the court indicated that if the extent of 
use was consistent with the transformative purpose, the fact that the whole work was displayed did not 
weigh against fair use.  Id. at 613. 
178 Id. at 614, citing American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-930, n. 17 (2nd 
Cir. 1994); Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 
1996); Fair Use Standard, n. 141 above at 1124; and 4 Nimmer On Copyright at §13.05[A][4] (n. 7 
above). 
179 336 F.3d at 820 ("they benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the 
Internet"); and 448 F.3d at 609-610 (Dorling Kindersley's "image display enhances the reader's 
understanding of the 'biographical text'"). 
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copyrighted works – could not have created the works the defendants created.  In both 
the courts determined whether there was infringement based on the ultimate use, and 
making the interim copies did not preclude a finding of fair use.  In both, because the 
third parties provided different works that the public would not otherwise have been able 
to access, the interim copying was part of a fair use.   
2. extraction of unprotected data  
Courts have also held that it is a fair use for persons to copy a copyrighted 
work in order to extract the factual parts of the database not protected by copyright and 
then discard the rest.  For instance, in Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. 
Wiredata, Inc., the owner of copyrighted software used to compile and store real estate 
tax assessment data sued for copyright infringement a company seeking access to that 
data for use by real estate brokers.180 Although the Seventh Circuit indicated the 
defendant had not needed to copy the whole software program in order to obtain the 
raw data, it added that the plaintiff would have lost the case "even if the raw data were 
so entangled with Market Drive that they could not be extracted without making a copy 
of the program."181 The intermediate copying of the operating system would be a fair 
use, since "the only purpose of the copying would be to extract non-copyrighted material 
and not to go into competition with AT by selling copies of Market Drive."182 In other 
 
180 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003). 
181 Id. at 644. 
182 Id. at 645.  The court also said that the copyright "owner is trying to secrete the data in its 
copyrighted program — a program the existence of which reduced the likelihood that the data would be 
retained in a form in which they would have been readily accessible.  It would be appalling if such attempt 
could succeed."  Id. at 642. 
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words the interim copying was justified, because it was the only way to gain access to 
unprotected elements of the work/database. 
Access was also a key issue in the finding of fair use in Nautical Solutions 
Marketing, Inc. v. Boats.com,183 which involved (1) use of a robot to extract the 
hypertext markup language (HTML) from web pages of Boats.com and (2) entering 
facts from that copied web page into a database searchable by the public.184 The 
district court said that the "momentary copying of Yacht World's public web pages in 
order to extract from Yacht listing facts unprotected by copyright law constitutes a fair 
use…"185 The court addressed the initial copying of the HTML as part of the third fair 
use factor, explaining that "because Yachtbroker.com's final product – the searchable 
database – contained no infringing material, the 'amount and substantiality of the portion 
used' is of little weight.186 
In both Assessment Technologies and Nautical Solutions, the plaintiffs 
attempted to prevent defendants from accessing plaintiffs' works, because plaintiffs did 
not want competition.  As long as the ultimate work of the defendants did not infringe 
the copyrights of plaintiffs, the interim copying of the copyrighted works was a fair use.   
 
183 2004 WL 783121 (M.D. Fla. 2004) 
184 The district court noted that NSM ultimately discarded the HTML.  Id. at *1. 
185 Id. at *2. 
186 See also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003 WL 21406289 (D. Calif. 2003) ("Taking 
the temporary copy of the electronic information [on a web site through use of a spider] for the limited 
purpose of extracting unprotected public facts leads to the conclusion that the temporary use of the 
electronic signals was 'fair use' and not actionable"). 
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3. reverse engineering 
Reverse engineering is a process "starting with the known product and 
working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or 
manufacture."187 For computer programs, reverse engineering can include the "use of a 
program known as a 'disassembler' to translate the ones and zeros of binary machine-
readable object code into the words and mathematical symbols of source code."188 
Such disassembly requires running the software program a number of times, which in 
turn means "copying of the program into RAM every time the computer is booted up."189 
Assuming a defendant acquires a computer program legally, running that program (and 
thus causing a copy to be loaded onto RAM) many times might not constitute copyright 
infringement.  First, a person acquires a program in order to run the program, so the 
person acquiring the program must have the consent of the copyright holder.190 
Second, 17 U.S.C. §117 provides a safe harbor for owners of a copy of a computer 
program to use that software.191 
Reverse engineering of software to make other software or hardware 
compatible, however, can include ultimately creating source code from the object code 
of the original software.192 That reverse engineered source code would be an infringing 
 
187 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). 
188 Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). 
189 Id. at 601. 
190 Of course, if a license restricts the use a licensee may make of a program, there may be a 
separate cause of action for breach of license instead of copyright infringement, if the software use 
exceeds what the license permits. 
191 See, e.g., Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
192 For a detailed discussion of software reverse engineering, see A. Johnson-Laird, "Software 
Reverse Engineering In The Real World," 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 843, 846 (Spring 1994):  "There are only 
four ways to perform software reverse engineering:  (1) read about the program; (2) observe the program 
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derivative work of the object code, unless fair use protected the creation of the source 
code.  A number of cases, some of which are discussed next, have applied fair use to 
such reverse engineering cases.193 
making software compatible with the equipment of a third party: The Ninth 
Circuit examined the fair use doctrine extensively in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, 
Inc.,194 which involved "reverse engineering" of Sega software by Accolade in order for 
Accolade to make its game cartridge software compatible with the Sega video game 
machines.195 Accolade had copied the object code "solely in order to discover the 
functional requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console — aspects of Sega's 
programs that are not protected by copyright."196 The court in Sega concluded that 
since there was no other method for studying the requirements for compatibility of the 
software in question, and there was "no evidence in the record that Accolade sought to 
avoid performing its own creative work," the first factor (purpose and character of use) 
weighed in favor of Accolade on the issue of fair use.197 
in operation by using it on a computer; (3) perform a static examination of the individual computer 
instructions contained within the program; or (4) perform a dynamic examination of the individual 
computer instructions as the program is being run on a computer."  Only methods (3) and (4) involve the 
reproduction of object or source code outside of the software.  Id. at 863-887.  As a result, only these two 
methods raise the possibility of copyright infringement. 
193 See also P. Samuelson and S. Scotchmer, "The Law And Economics Of Reverse Engineering" 
111 Yale L. J. 1575 (May 2002); D. Prestin, "Where To Draw The Line Between Reverse Engineering 
And Infringement:  Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.," 3 Minn. Intell.  Prop. Rev. 137 
(2002); and R.V. Donohoe, "Does Intermediate Copying Of Computer Software For The Purpose Of 
Reverse Engineering A Non-Infringing Product Infringe The Copyright In Software?", 2001 B.C. Intell. 
Prop. & Tech. F. 111301 (2001). 
194 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
195 The fact that the copying was for a commercial purpose weighed against the finding of fair use.  
Id. at 1522. 
196 Id. (emphasis added). 
197 Id. at 1522.  In examining the second factor (the nature of the copyrighted work), the court in 
Sega noted that works of fiction receive greater protection than works which have strong functional 
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The court concluded that the fourth factor (effect of use on market) 
weighed in favor of Accolade, even though Sega could suffer some economic loss as a 
result of the copying.198 The court said the identification of the functional requirements 
for Genesis' compatibility resulted in increased numbers of video game programs, and it 
was "precisely this growth in creative expression, based on the dissemination of other 
creative works and the unprotected ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright 
Act was intended to promote."199 The court in Sega rejected the argument of Sega that 
Accolade was improperly "free-riding" on the efforts of Sega and held Accolade's 
disassembly/copying of the computer program to be fair use of the copyrighted work.200 
The Federal Circuit similarly said that "reverse engineering object code to 
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use" in Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.201 The Federal Circuit added, however, that any 
"reproduction of protectable expression must be strictly necessary to ascertain the 
bounds of protected information within the work."202 
elements.  Id. at 1524.  The court, however, said that computer programs were utilitarian articles that 
accomplished tasks, and concluded that since the video game program in question contained unprotected 
aspects which could not be examined without at least temporary copying, the copyright law afforded the 
program a lower degree of protection than more traditional literary works and ruled that the second 
statuary favor weighed in favor of Accolade.197 Id. at 1524-1526. 
198 As to the third factor, the court noted that Accolade disassembled the entire program written by 
Sega, so the third factor weighed against Accolade.  However, the court noted that when the ultimate use 
was as limited as it was in that case, the third factor was of very little weight.  Id. at 1526-7. 
199 Id. at 1523, citing Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  On the other hand, courts have said "to negate fair 
use one need only show that if the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect 
the potential market for the copyrighted work.'"  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568, quoting Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 451.  In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court added that the consideration of the effect of a use on the 
market "must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative 
works."  471 U.S. at 568. 
200 977 F.2d at 1527-1528. 
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making equipment compatible with software of a third party: Connectix 
had used the operating system of a Sony PlayStation to develop a program (the 
PlayStation emulator) for individuals to use computers rather than the Sony PlayStation 
to play Sony games.203 Before it started marketing its PlayStation emulator, Connectix 
substituted its own operating system — which did not contain any of Sony's copyrighted 
material — for Sony operating systems.  The district court preliminarily enjoined 
Connectix from selling or distributing the Virtual Game Station for Macintosh or 
Windows-based computer systems. 
Relying on its earlier decision in Sega, the Ninth Circuit in Sony reversed 
the decision of the district court and dissolved the injunction.  The foundation of the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion was that (1) "[c]opyrighted software ordinarily contains both 
copyrighted and unprotected or functional elements," and (2) for an internal program 
which did not produce a screen display, the only way to gain access to the program's 
functional (unprotectable) elements was through copying and reverse engineering the 
program.204 The Ninth Circuit said that when only intermediate copying was involved, 
the amount and substantiality of the use was afforded "very little weight."205 
The Ninth Circuit concluded the nature of the copyrighted work favored 
Connectix, noting that since Sony's operating system contained unprotected functional 
aspects that could not be examined without copying, the operating system had a "lower 
 
203 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Calif. 1999), 
reversed 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
204 Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d at 599.  
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degree of protection than more traditional literary works."206 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
Sony's argument that the reverse engineering was unnecessary, and said the 
"necessity" it "addressed in Sega was the necessity of the method, i.e., disassembly, 
not the necessity of the number of times that method was applied."207 
4. summary of interim copying cases 
In the reverse engineering and database cases discussed in §§2 and 3 
above, plaintiffs wanted to deny access to third parties to prevent competition, an anti-
dissemination motive that does not seem appropriate for fair use to recognize as a 
favorable factor.208 In Arriba and Bill Graham, discussed in § 1 above, the plaintiffs 
could not have created from works of their original copyrighted works the works 
defendants had created.  In all of the cases in §§1-3, as long as the ultimate works of 
 
205 Id. at 606, quoting Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-7.  Of course, as indicated above, at some level (e.g., 
the individual words in a book, and the different specks of paint in a painting) all works contain 
unprotected elements. 
206 203 F.3d at 603, quoting Sega at 1524-6.  Of course, as discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 57-61 above, all copyrighted works have elements that copyright law does not protect. 
207 203 F.3d at 605.  See also, Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc. 79 F.3d 1532, 1539-1540, n.18, (11th 
Cir. 1996)("And although there has been some uncertainty as to whether reverse engineering constitutes 
copyright infringement, the one federal circuit court that has squarely addressed the issue has concluded 
that reverse engineering may be a fair use.   See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
1527-28 (9th Cir.1992) ….  See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 
(Fed.Cir.1992) (concluding that "reverse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a 
computer program is a fair use," although denying the defendant's fair use claim, based on the fact that it 
was wrongfully in possession of the source code).   We find the Sega opinion persuasive in view of the 
principal purpose of copyright-the advancement of science and the arts."). 
208 See, e.g., Economic Analysis, n. 19 above at 359 ("The suppression of an unfavorable review 
would be comparable to concealment by an ordinary seller of a defect in his goods"); and Market Failure,
n. 65 above at p. 1632-1633 ("Section 107 places first among the purposes for which fair use is 
appropriate 'criticism' and 'comment', uses that a copyright owner might be reluctant to license….  Even if 
money were offered, the owner of a play is unlikely to license a hostile review or a parody of his own 
drama; a publicity-shy tycoon who owns the copyright on magazine articles discussing his life is unlikely 
to license a biographer to use those articles; a candidate for governor is unlikely to license his 
copyrighted campaign music to be utilized in his opponent's televised advertisement; and the publisher of 
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defendants did not infringe, the courts concluded interim copying not seen by the 
ultimate consumer did not preclude a finding of fair use. 
The McGraw Plaintiffs can argue that the Google Database contains 
complete books and not just unprotected facts.  However, Google can argue in 
response that the Google Database simply contains unprotectable words and the words 
are not arranged in a database as they are arranged on paper.  The Google Database, 
in other words, provides an analysis of the words and the arrangement of a small 
number of the words, so has a different purpose and function than the individual books 
scanned to create the Google Database.  A court should disregard the interim copying 
in determining whether the Library Project is a fair use. 
B. MP3.com – Commercial Distribution of Exact Copies Does Not 
Support a Finding of Fair Use 
The McGraw Plaintiffs may argue that based on the decision in UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,209 the scanning of books to implement the Library 
Project precludes a finding of fair use.  In UMG, MP3.com had purchased thousands of 
CDs, and without the authorization of the copyright owners of the sound recordings in  
those CDs, MP3.com copied the sound recordings onto MP3.com's servers to replay for 
subscribers.  MP3.com said that a subscriber could only get access to the recordings 
from MP3.com by first proving that the subscriber owned the CD in question.210 Once 
that hurdle was crossed, the user could -- anyplace in the world that had Internet access 
 
209 92 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
210 "by inserting his copy of the commercial CD into his computer CD-Rom drive for a few seconds 
(the 'Beam-it Service') or must purchase the CD from one of defendant's cooperating online retailers (the 
'instant Listening Service')."  Id. at 350.   
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-- listen to, but not download, that recording via computer.211 The court held that 
MP3.com’s activities did not constitute a fair use. 212 
Reflecting an inaccurate understanding of copyright, the court said, 
"Copyright … is not designed to afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, 
to protect the copyrightholders' property interests."213 This rejection of consumer 
interests and the public interest is not consistent with the majority of copyright 
authorities.214 
In spite of its inaccurate characterization of the purpose of copyright law, 
the court's decision in UMG does not conflict with the cases holding that interim copying 
of works can be fair use.215 In UMG the final product of the third party was identical to 
the copyright owner’s product, in contrast to the interim copying cases, where the third 
party’s final product was not substantially similar to the copyright owners product. 
 
211 "The data  is transferred over the Internet via 'streaming,' a technique that allows information to 
flow through the Internet to the user's computer without saving it as a mp3 file on the user's hard drive."  
S. Steele, "UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.: Signaling The Need For A Deeper Analysis Of 
Copyright Infringement Of Digital Recordings," 21 Loy.L.A.Ent.L.Rev. 31 (2000). 
212 The court noted that the use was commercial, stating that "while subscribers to My.MP3.com are 
not currently charged a fee, defendant seeks to attract a sufficiently large subscription base to draw 
advertising and otherwise make a profit."  Id. at 350.  The second and third fair use factors easily 
supported a finding of infringement, since the works were creative and artistic and defendant had copied 
all of each work.  Id. at 351-352. 
213 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
214 See e.g., notes 55, 56 and 67 above.  See also Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (in a fair use analysis, "we are free to consider the public benefit resulting from 
a particular use notwithstanding the fact that the alleged infringer may gain commercially"); and Cable 
News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1483 (11th Cir. 1991) 
("the court is charged with protecting the public interest" in cases claiming copyright infringement). 
215 The court rejected the argument that the copies of the CD's made by MP3.com were not exact 
copies as follows:  "defendant claims that the simulated sounds on MP3-based music files are not 
physically identical to the sounds on the original CD recordings….  Defendant concedes, however, that 
the human ear cannot detect a difference between the two…. Moreover, defendant admits that a goal of 
its copying is to create a music file that is sonically as identical to the original CD as possible….  In such 
circumstances, some slight, humanly undetectable difference between the original and the copy does not 
qualify for exclusion from the coverage of the Act."  Id. at 350, n. 1. 
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The court in UMG rejected MP3.com’s argument that the use was a 
"transformative 'space shift' by which subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings 
contained on their CDs without lugging around the physical discs themselves…."216 
Although defendant's argument about space shifting on first glance appears to be 
similar to the argument about time-shifting in Sony, there were at least three factual 
distinctions between UMG and Sony.217 First, in Sony the allegedly infringing use (the 
consumers' copying of the broadcasts) was non-commercial, whereas in UMG the 
allegedly infringing use (MP3.com's copying and broadcasting of the CD's) was 
commercial.218 Second, in Sony the broadcasters had distributed the content (the 
telecasts) to all consumers at no cost, whereas in UMG the copyright holders had sold 
the content (the CD's) to stores, for the stores to sell to consumers.  Third, in UMG 
MP3.com was effectively distributing the sound recordings to the public, whereas the 
home viewers in Sony were not. 219 
MP3.com argued that the fourth factor did not favor UMG, because users 
could only gain access through MP3.com by purchasing the original works, thus 
increasing sales of the copyright owners.  The court rejected this argument, saying that 
any positive effect the use might have on the original market did not free "defendant to 
usurp a further market that directly derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs' 
 
216 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
217 If UMG were inconsistent with Sony, moreover, the McGraw Plaintiffs would not be able to argue 
that UMG should control the Google Litigation, since the Supreme Court decision would prevail. 
218 See notes 94-96 and 211 above. 
219 12 U.S.C. §106(3).  Under 17 U.S.C. §106(6), a copyright holder also has the exclusive right "to 
do and to authorize …in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission."  However, the district court did not discuss this right in the decision cited 
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copyrighted works."220 The court also said a copyrighterholder had “the right, within 
broad limits, to curb the development of … a derivative market by refusing to license a 
copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds acceptable."221 
Yet the court was referring to derivative markets, not derivative products, and in UMG,
there was no derivative product, only a derivative market.  The decision in UMG does 
not support an argument that the Library Project constitutes copyright infringement.   
C. The Library Project Represents a Fair Use 
If the ultimate work is not infringing and as a practical matter the only 
feasible way to create the ultimate work is through the interim copying of another work 
that the consumer never sees, that interim copying should not prevent a finding of fair 
use. 222 Such interim copying is necessary in at least two situations.  First, the copyright 
 
in this article.  It is interesting that the district court did not try to distinguish the result in Sony from the 
result in UMG.
220 Id. at 352. 
221 The court did note, however, that plaintiffs had  introduced substantial evidence that they had 
"taken steps to enter that market by entering into various licensing agreements." Id.   
222 Sections 108-122 of the Copyright Act contain certain exemptions on the "exclusive rights" of 
copyright holders listed in section 106.  These exemptions include certain reproductions of works by 
libraries and archives (§108).  In order to fall within one of the permitted uses in §108, the library or 
archive must meet three preconditions.  The first precondition in §108 – that the reproduction/distribution 
be performed without any purpose of commercial advantage – would exclude the Library Project from 
exemption under §108.  Google is creating the Database with the purpose of commercial advantage.  
However, the fact that the Library Project does not fit within the §108 exemption should not preclude a 
finding of fair use with respect to the Library Project is not a fair use.  In fact, §108(f) says "[n]othing in this 
section … (4) in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107…."  Cf., Texaco, 37 F3d 
at 898  ("section 108 of the Copyright Act narrowly circumscribes the conditions under which libraries are 
permitted to make copies of copyrighted works ….  Though this section states that it does not in any way 
affect the right of fair use, … the very fact that Congress restricted the rights of libraries to make copies 
implicitly suggests that Congress views journal publishers as possessing the right to restrict 
photocopying, or at least the right to demand a licensing royalty from nonpublic institutions that engage in 
photocopying.  Second, Congress apparently prompted the development of CCC by suggesting that an 
efficient mechanism be established to license photocopying").  For critiques of those §108 guidelines, see 
K. Crews, "The Law Of Fair Use And The Illusion Of Fair Use Guidelines," 62 Ohio St. L. J. 599 (2001); 
and A. Bartow, "Educational Fair Use In Copyright:  Reclaiming The Right To Photocopy Freely," 60 U. 
Pittsburgh L. Rev. 149 (Fall, 1998). 
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holder may not be able – from her copyrighted works – to create the new work, such as 
in Arriba and Graham. Second, as in the database and reverse engineering cases, the 
copyright holder may not want to allow third parties to have access to and copy the 
copyrighted works, because the third parties would compete with the original copyright 
holder.223 In each situation, third parties would create original works the copyright 
holder would not create.  Allowing third parties to create such works that the public 
could use would further the purpose of copyright laws to stimulate creative activity.224 
This would lead to the conclusion that the Library Project is a fair use, 
because as a practical way, there would be no other way to create the Google 
Database, and the ultimate work viewed by the consumer does not infringe any 
copyrighted work.  When the copying that the public does not see is disregarded and 
the importance of access is added, the conclusion of fair use for the Library Project 
seems clear: 
 
What Google user views 
1.  Character and 
purpose of allegedly 
infringing use 
a. Commercial - favors copyright holders, but commercial 
nature generally not considered important when third party 
transforms purpose and end result of work. 
b.  transformative purpose is to educate individuals on where 
223 Even without attributing an improper anti-dissemination motive to a plaintiff, when a "defendant 
has 'filled a market niche that the [copyright owner] simply had no  interest in occupying," then a finding of 
fair use is appropriate.  Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1387 (6th Cir. 1996), quoting in part Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 
1377 (2nd Cir. 1993).  In Princeton, the Sixth Circuit added, "Only 'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed markets' are to be considered in this connection, and even the availability of an existing 
system for collecting licensing fees will not be conclusive."  99 F.3d at 1387, quoting in part American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-931 (2nd Cir. 1994).  In Princeton, because there was 
a functioning market, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the copying was not a fair use.   
224 Arguably allowing copyright holders to exclude competition might give the holders incentives to 
create more works, but that incentive is not the kind the Copyright Act encourages or recognizes as valid.  
See, n. 208 above. 
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What Google user views 
books on specific subjects are located, not what the books 
say on those subjects.  What consumer sees of any individual 
book is not substantially similar to the specific book—favors 
Google 
2.  Nature of 
copyrighted work 
Favors copyright holders slightly, but since amount shown to 
users fits with the transformative, educational purpose of 
work, this factor not significant 





Minor pieces of works shown to viewer —favors Google 
4.  Effect on markets 
for copyrighted work 
and derivatives 
Realistically copyright holder could not create the market (but 
could only license individual book titles) -- favors Google 
5.  Access to 
Knowledge 
Gives users throughout the world access to knowledge of 
which libraries hold books on any variety of subjects and 
some few sentences in the books, to help user determine if 
she wants to try to obtain a copy of that book from the library 
holding the book or from the publisher.  Individual copyright 
holders cannot provide that knowledge with only their 
copyrighted works.  Favors Google 
The above table for the Library Project does not answer the fair use 
question for the Kikuyu Key, however.  With the Kikuyu Key, unlike the Library Project, 
the final product would be substantially similar in expression to the book in English, 
albeit in a different language, so would constitute a derivative work whose creation the 
copyright holder had a right to prevent.225 The copyright holder would have a right to 
prevent the translation, unless the translation was a fair use, so the next section of this 
article addresses the question of a translation as a fair use. 
 
225 Under §106(2), the owner of a copyright has the "exclusive" right "to prepare derivative works 
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IV. TRANSLATING LITERARY WORKS INTO THE LANGUAGES OF CITIZENS 
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHO WOULD OTHERWISE REMAIN 
UNSERVED SHOULD BE A FAIR USE 
In addition to the Library Project, Google offers to translate for free into a 
multitude of languages – at the request of users -- web pages and text submitted by the 
user.226 Separately, software programs are available for sale to automatically translate 
English works into many other languages.227 Google may argue that the translation of 
web pages from one language to another language by individual computer users is no 
different than the private time-shifting approved as fair use in Sony, and also that by 
publishing web pages without copy protection, the owners of the web pages have 
consented to such translations.228 The manufacturers of the translation programs 
probably obtain an agreement from consumers that they will not use the software in any 
improper way, trying to protect the software manufacturer from a claim of contributing to 
copyright infringement.  Rather than trying to skirt the copyright issues presented by 
translations, this part of the article directly addresses translations.229 
Although a translation of a copyrighted work is a derivative work,230 
presumably a publisher of textbooks would be willing – upon the receipt of some 
fee(s) -- to license third parties to translate that publisher's textbooks into Kikuyu and 
 
226 See http://www.google.com/language_tools, visited 8/15/06 
227 See e.g., http://www.translution.com, visited 8/15/06; and http://translation.net and 
http://www.smartlinkcorp.com/translation-software/about.html, visited 8/14/06. 
228 Cf. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 ("Websites that do not wish to be 
indexed, or that wish to have only certain content indexed, can do so by signaling to Google's web 
crawler those parts that are 'off limits.'  Google's web crawler honors those limits."). 
229 It would seem particularly appropriate to use computers to help narrow the Digital Divide rather 
than increasing the divide created as the result of digital media.  Moreover, since the books will be in 
some digital form in the Google Database, if someone developed effective translation programs for the 
applicable languages, the process of translation might become much more efficient. 
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distribute those translated textbooks, just as the publisher may already have done for 
the translation of those textbooks into French, German or Japanese.  The publisher will 
lose a license fee if a third party can translate the book into Kikuyu and distribute the 
translations in Kenya without permission of and payment of a fee to the publisher.  Why 
should such translation and distribution of textbooks – without the third party paying a 
license fee to the copyright holder – be a fair use?  Why shouldn't all translations made 
without the permission of the copyright holder be illegal derivative works?  This part IV 
answers those questions. 
A. Fair Use is Not Simply an Economic Balancing Test 
Fair use entails more than economic considerations and "seeks to 
accommodate the author's need for remuneration and control while recognizing that in 
specific instances the author's rights must give way before a social need for access 
and use."231 The "careful balance between protecting rights of 'owners' and ensuring 
public benefit by facilitating access to protected works has been the framework 
within which the constitutional imperative to 'promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts' has historically been pursued."232 Advocates of the economic analysis of 
law agree that "[s]triking the balance between access and incentives is the central 
problem in copyright law." 233 
Case law supports the scholars who recognize that fair use balancing is 
more than an economic exercise and can include free speech and the related principle 
 
230 See last paragraph in IIIC. above, and see IV.B.1. below. 
231 Fair Use, n. 14 above, at 1602 (Emphasis added).   
232 Givers, Takers, n. 5 above, at 111.  (Emphasis added). 
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of access.  In Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc., a
"technologically-induced collision between the free speech doctrine and a broad media-
owned copyright" produced the fair use dispute.234 The Eleventh Circuit said "[i]t is 
axiomatic that learning relative to a work requires access to the work in which the ideas 
are included…."235 In the past, the requirement of publication to obtain a federal 
copyright before 1978 had ensured access to books in paper format.  Since Congress 
eliminated in 1978 the requirement of publishing a work for that work to receive a 
federal copyright, the Eleventh Circuit said that fair use had become a more important 
tool in preserving access to literary works.236 
The Fifth Circuit, in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., similarly described fair use as "a 'rule of reason' fashioned by Judges 
to balance the author's right to compensation of his work, on the one hand, against the 
 
233 Economic Analysis, n. 19 above, at 326.   
234 940 F.2d 1471, 1472 & 1478 (11th Cir. 1991).  The court said legal developments embraced an:  
"(1) … interpretation of the First Amendment recognizing that free speech encompasses the right of 
access to the free flow of ideas;  and (2) the elimination of the requirement of publication as a condition 
for statutory copyright, thereby ensuring public access.   The advent of new communications technology 
has blurred the distinction between product and process, a distinction which served as a practical 
limitation on a copyright owner's right to limit access to the work (i.e., product)." Id. at 1478.   The court 
described the defendant as "a national video monitoring service  that monitors television programming 
nationwide, including CNN's, and provides copes of program segments and other information requested 
by its clients.  " Id. at 1474.  The service provided such copies to its clients, so the clients could verify that 
the advertisements or other content that the clients had contracted for CNN to run had in fact aired on 
television.  Id. 
235 Id. at 1478, n. 12.  Quoting from the  introduction of the Dean of Columbia Law School to 
Benjamin Kaplan's An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967), the Eleventh Circuit said "that greater 
emphasis should be placed on the public's interest in the free accessibility of ideas is particularly 
appropriate in an era when freedom of expression is frequently under attack and when the means of 
dissemination of ideas are increasingly concentrated in fewer hands."  Id. at 1479. 
236 Id. at 1484-1485.  The court also said that "[a]fter Feist it cannot be assumed that every newscast 
would qualify for even compilation copyright status."    Id. at 1485.  Reversing the injunction issued by the 
district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that "any injunction that would prevent the copying of CNN's 
newscasts "in any part" would be inconsistent with the Copyright Act, particularly its fair use provisions, 
and both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment to the Constitution."  Id. 
68 
 
©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 
public's interest in the widest possible dissemination of ideas and information, on 
the other."237 Triangle claimed that the copying by the defendant of a cover page of 
Triangle’s publication for purposes of comparative advertising constituted copyright 
infringement.  While agreeing that copyright law protected Triangle’s cover page, the 
Fifth Circuit said that fair use often served to avoid potential conflicts between copyright 
law and freedom of speech. 238 Noting the benefits to the public of comparative 
advertising, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the comparative advertising constituted fair 
use, regardless of any adverse market effect the advertising could have had on 
Triangle. 239 
Of course, simply looking at the four statutory fair use factors shows that 
only the fourth factor is an express economic consideration.  A fair use regime limited to 
economic considerations might be satisfactory to authors of existing content, but such a 
regime could decrease the production of new creative works by making it more difficult 
for authors to borrow from existing works and could harm society as a result, and 
 
237 626 F.2d 1178, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980)(Emphasis added), quoting Sobel, Copyright and the First 
Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP Copyright L.Symp. 43, n. 1 at 51, in turn quoting Latman, 
Fair Use of Copyrighted Works 5 (Sen.Comm. on Judiciary Study No. 141960)."  In Triangle, some of the 
alleged infringements occurred before the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, and one occurred 
after the effective date.  The Firth Circuit concluded the outcome would be the same under both the Act of 
1909 and the 1976 Act, so limited its analysis to the 1976 Act.  626 F.2d at 1173, n. 6. 
238 Id. at 1174, citing Denicola, "Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the 
Protection of Expression," 67 Calif.L.Rev. 283, 299, 303-304 (1979); and Case Note, "Copyright and the 
First Amendment, Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F.Supp. 875 
(S.D.Fla. 1978)," 1979 Wisc.L.Rev. 242, 246 & n. 26. 
239 626 F.2d at 1177-1178.  The Fifth Circuit did note that no adverse economic effect had been 
shown.  The district court had held fair use did not apply, but denied injunctive relief on the grounds of 
First Amendment Protection.  Id.  In light of its holding that fair use applied, the Fifth Circuit concluded it 
should not reach the First Amendment issue and affirmed the decision of the district court on the alternate 
ground of fair use. 
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conflict with the purpose of the Copyright Clause.240 Under fair use, in other words 
there must be a balance between (a) the economic interests of authors in having control 
over their works and (b) the benefit to the public in allowing others to access and make 
a variety of uses of those works.   
B. The Fact That a Translation by a Third Party is a Derivative Work 
Does Not Prevent It From Being a Fair Use 
1. The right of authors to create derivative works 
Although copyright and fair use involve balancing, authors have the 
exclusive right under §106(2)241 to create a "derivative work," defined as a "work based 
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted."242 Applying that definition broadly, "almost all works are 
 
240 See Economic Analysis, n. 19 above at p. 332 ("beyond some level copyright protection may 
actually be counterproductive by raising the cost of expression….Creating a new work typically involves 
borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works, as well as adding original expression to 
it….The less extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator can borrow 
from previous works without infringing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of creating a new 
work….The effect [of maximum copyright protection] would be to raise the cost of creating new works—
the costs of expression, broadly defined—and thus paradoxically, perhaps lower the number of works 
created." 
241 Cf. M. A. Lemley, "The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law," 75 Tex. L. Rev. 
989, 1017 (1997) ("It is not clear precisely how a derivative work differs from a nonliteral copy, or what 
section 106(2) adds to the provisions of 106(1).") 
242 17 U.S.C. §§106(2) and 101.  The Copyright Act of 1909 gave the copyright holder the exclusive 
right to "translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version 
thereof, if it be a literary work."  8 Nimmer on Copyright App. 6-3, §1(b) of Act (n. 7 above).  Prior to that 
time, making a translation of a copyrighted work was not an infringement.  See, eg., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 
F. Cas. 201, 207-208 (Cir. Ct., E.D.PA. 1853) ("To make a good translation of a work, often requires more 
learning, talent and judgment than was required to write the original … A translation may, in loose 
phraseaology, be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it 
be called a copy of her book"). 
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derivative works in that in some degree they are derived from pre-existing works."243 
For instance, all books written in English have structures – such as sentences and 
paragraphs – and words and phrases that previous authors have used.  The courts 
have concluded, however, that in order for a second work to be a derivative work within 
the meaning of copyright law, the author of the second work must have "substantially 
copied" expression from the prior work.244 
If a second work's expression is not substantially similar to an earlier work 
in some meaningful respect, there is no infringement, and there does not need to be a 
fair use analysis.  It is only when the second work is substantially similar to an earlier 
copyrighted work in some meaningful respect, presenting a prima facie case of 
copyright infringement, that a court may have to consider the defense of fair use in 
analyzing whether there has been copyright infringement.245 
243 1 Nimmer on Copyright §3.01, p. 3-3 (n. 7 above).  See also, Campbell, 568 U.S. at 576 ("as 
Justice Story explained, "[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, 
things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, 
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used 
before." Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass.1845)"). 
244 Litchfied v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984).  Not all the courts have used the 
identical test for determining how much the second work must have copied from the first work to be a 
derivative work.  See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2004)(A second 
work can be a derivative work "even if it has 'a different total concept or feel from the original work'," if, for 
instance, the second work "copied or condensed the qualitative core of one marketable portion" of the 
earlier work.); and  Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993-994 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("it is … whether the 'total 
concept and feel' of the works and their 'aesthetic appeal' is the same," quoting in part Knitwaves, Inc. v. 
Lollytogs Limited, 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2nd Cir. 1995)). 
245 See 4 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A] at p. 13-158 (n. 7 above) ("fair use is a defense not 
because of the absence of substantial similarity but rather despite the fact that the similarity is 
substantial"); and Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144, 
citing 4 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A] (n. 7 above) ("secondary users need invoke the for use defense 
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2. Fair use of derivative works 
In spite of the copyright holder's right to make derivative works under 
§106(2), a derivative work prepared by a third party without the consent of the copyright 
holder can be a fair use.  After all, §107 begins, "Notwithstanding the provisions of 
sections 106 and 106A….", the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of 
copyright.  This "Notwithstanding" qualification makes the right to create derivative 
works in §106(2) subject to the fair use statute, just as the Supreme Court held in 
Harper & Row that this qualification made the right to first publication in §106(3) subject 
to fair use.246 In Campbell, for instance, the Court recognized that 2 Live Crew's song 
was a derivative work and said that it "would be an infringement of Acoff-Rose's rights in 
'The Pretty Woman' … but for a finding of fair use through parody."247 As discussed 
above, the Court held that 2 Live Crew's song, a derivative work, was a fair use.248 
A more recent case evidencing that a derivative work by a third party can 
constitute a fair use is Ty, Inc. v. Publications Intern. Ltd., in which the Seventh Circuit 
addressed a claim that books described as collectors' guides to "Beanie Babies" were 
illegal derivative works of Beanie Babies.249 The district court had granted summary 
judgment for Ty and had enjoined Publications from selling any of the books, and the 
Seventh Circuit agreed the photographs of the Beanie Babies in the books were 
 
246 471 U.S. at 552 ("the right of first publication, like the other rights enumerated in §106, is 
expressly made subject to the fair use provision of §107"). 
247 510 U.S. at 574-575, n. 4, and 590  
248 See §II.B.4. above. 
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derivative works.250 However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's injunction 
because of fair use, and said the issue on remand was whether "the use of the photos 
[derivative works] is a fair use because it is the only way to prepare a collectors' 
guide."251 In other words, even though the photographs were derivative works, they 
may have been fair uses.252 Similarly, the mere fact that a translation into Kikuyu of a 
copyrighted book in English would constitute a derivative work would not mean the 
translation constituted copyright infringement.253 
On the other hand, differences in content alone between substantially 
similar works cannot make the second work "transformative" in the sense that the 
differences favor a finding of fair use, or else all translations would be transformative 
works that favored fair use.254 In Sony, Justice O'Connor did not use "transformative" to 
 
250 Id. at 520. 
251 Id. at 522. 
252 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit said that the textual portions of a collectors' guide "are not among 
the examples of derivative works listed in the statute, and guides don't recast, transform, or adapt the 
things to which they are guides."  292 F.3d at 502.  The court said a "derivative work thus must either be 
in one of the forms named [in the definition in §101] or be 'recast, transformed, or adapted,'" quoting in 
part Lee in A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997).  The court said "a collectors' guide is very much 
like a book review, which is a guide to a book and which no one supposes is a derivative work.  Both the 
book review and the collectors' guide are critical and evaluative as well as purely informational . . . ."  292 
F.3d at 520-521.  However, the definition of derivative works begins with the statement it is a "work based 
upon one or more preexisting works," so it seems the overall books were in part derivative works.  That 
would not change the basic question of the court, were the books fair uses of the original works, even 
though the books were derivative works. 
253 Bohanan has commented, "Paradoxically, while the 'transformative' quality of a defendant's use 
of a copyrighted work bolsters the defendant's claim of fair use, the derivative works right reserves to the 
copyright owner the right to make any work 'in which the copyright work may be recast, transformed, or 
adopted.'  There is an obvious conflict between Congress's use of the word 'transformed' in the definition 
of 'derivative work' and the Court's use of the word 'transformative' in the elaboration of the fair use 
defense."  C. Bohannan, "Reclaiming Copyright," 23 Cardoza Arts & Ent. L. J. 567, 595 (2006) (hereafter 
Reclaiming Copyright), citing Givers, Takers, n. 5 above, at pp. 124-128. 
254 If someone made a new Rocky movie (would it be Rocky 7?) without the consent of the copyright 
holder of the original Rocky movie, the fact that there were significant changes in the plot would not make 
Rocky 7 a fair use.  The copyright holder of the original Rocky would have the exclusive right to make 
Rocky 7, even though it was "transformative" in the sense that there was a new plot.  See, e.g., Dr. Seuss 
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refer to changes in content alone, but said the "central purpose of this [fair use] 
investigation is to see … whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the 
original creation … or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message…."255 (Emphasis 
added).  Whether labeling this "something extra" a change in function, a complementary 
product or transformative, there must be more than changes in content to cause a court 
to consider a derivative work to be a fair use rather than an infringing derivative work.256 
3. Translations 
Courts have rejected fair use defenses in two cases involving translations.  
In Radji v. Khakbaz, the district court directly considered the fair use defense to a claim 
of copyright infringement for Khakbaz's translation into Farsi of a work originally 
published in English.257 Excerpts of that book had been published in a London 
newspaper with the permission of Radji, the copyright holder.258 However, without the 
 
Enterprises, 109 F. 3d at 1401 and n. 164 above.  ("Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly 
mimic Dr. Seuss' characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridicule….  use the Cat's stove-pipe 
hat, the narrator ('Dr. Juice'), and the title (The Cat NOT in the Hat!) to get attention….  Because there is 
no effort to create a transformative work with 'new expression, meaning, or message,' the infringing 
work's commercial use further cuts against the fair use defense.") 
255 Sony, 510 U.S. at 579. 
256 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-585; and Ty, 292 F.3d at 517 ("Generalizing from this example in 
economic terminology that has become orthodox in fair-use case law, we may say that copying that is 
complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, 
but copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or 
screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work…is not fair use").  Nimmer on Copyright
prefers to use a "functional test," not "complementary" or "transformative".  See 2 Nimmer on Copyright
§13.05 [A][1][b], p. 13-170; and §13.05 [B], pp. 13-205–13-219.  (see n. 7 above). 
257 The book described Radji's service as Iran's ambassador to Great Britain 607 F.Supp. 1296 
(D.D.C. 1985) 
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permission of Radji, Khakbaz translated large portions of those excerpts into Farsi, 
which the Iran Times then published. 
The district court rejected the fair use defense.  The court said, 
"Defendants' reprinting of the 80 days of diary entries in a commercial publication was 
presumably intended to boost sales and thus was for commercial rather than non-profit 
educational purposes."259 The second and third factors also favored a finding of 
infringement, because the book was a "highly subjective and introspective account" of 
the author's service in Great Britain, and because the defendants had copied the large 
majority of the excerpts published in the London newspaper.260 Even if the articles in 
Farsi increased interest in and thus sales of the book, the fourth factor favored a finding 
of infringement, because the articles in Farsi "certainly prejudiced the sale of a 
serialization of his book in Farsi in a different magazine or newspaper."261 The sale of 
the work in Farsi by the copyright holder was not speculative, moreover, because Radji 
was Iranian and would reasonably have been expected to sell his book in Farsi in Iran.  
In fact Radji had "translated his book into Farsi in late 1983."262 
259 Id. at 1300.  The court rejected the argument that the articles were newsworthy and that fact 
favored fair use:  "an argument of newsworthiness can always be made where the author of the original 
work is a well-known person or where the book or article described political or other events of 
significance, but that is not per se a defense to an infringement action."  Id. 
260 Id. at 1301 – 1302. 
261 Id. at 1303. 
262 Id. at 1302.  The court added that by the time plaintiff had translated his work into Farsi, 
"defendants' articles had already been circulated in Farsi in marketplaces where plaintiff wished to sell his 
book, and this was bound to injure substantially many of the same marketplace sales of plaintiff's own 
Farsi version."  Id. 
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The Second Circuit's decision in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline 
Business Data263 also held that the translations of plaintiff's copyrighted works by the 
defendant were not fair uses.  In Nihon, the plaintiff was a Japanese corporation that 
published financial news and made many of its articles available in English.  Defendant 
separately translated the articles from Japanese into English and sold the abstracts – 
rough translations – of the articles to its customers.  The Second Circuit held that the 
abstracts were for commercial purposes and were not transformative, weighing in favor 
of a finding of infringement.264 The Second Circuit also said that "Comline's abstracts 
compete with and supersede" the Nihon articles, a factor that "weighed strongly against 
fair use."265 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of no fair use. 
4. Summary 
Neither the decision in Radji nor Nihon suggests that an unauthorized 
translation of a literary work is always an infringement.  Radji and Nihon did hold that 
the translations in those cases were not transformative, but that does not end the 
analysis under the fair use factors.  In Radji, a reasonable person would have 
concluded that Radji would translate his work into Farsi and sell it in Iran in competition 
with the derivative work, and Radji did have such a translation made.  Similarly, in 
Nihon, Nihon in fact had translated many of its works into English prior to the 
 
263 166 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
264 Id. at 72 – 73. 
265 Id. at 73.  The Second Circuit concluded that the second factor may have been neutral, and the 
third factor favored the plaintiff. 
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commencement of the litigation.266 In each Radji and Nihon, in other words, the 
translations of defendants were sold commercially and were substitutes for translations 
of the plaintiffs.  There was a concrete threat of economic harm to the plaintiff for works 
of the plaintiff in the same language as the works of the defendants.  There was no lack 
of meaningful access to the works of the type defendants had produced for the 
individuals in the markets in question, so no reason to conclude that access favored a 
finding of fair use. 
In contrast, when (1) translations are provided on a non-profit basis and 
give access to persons in desperate need of such literary works and (2) the publisher 
has not previously created or licensed such translations, fair use should be a bridge to 
create access.  The next three sections of this article discusses that position. 
C. Not Considering Potential Licensing Income 
Economic theory forms a significant foundation for copyright law in the 
United States.267 Posner has said that in order "to promote economic efficiency," 
copyright law's "principle legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the 
benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and 
the costs of administering copyright protection."268 As indicated above, the market 
analysis of copyright law argues that "[o]nly when the desired transfer of resource use is 
unlikely to take place spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as market 
 
266 Plaintiff "also makes many of its Japanese articles available in English through wire services, an 
English language website, and a licensing agreement with LEXIS/NEXIS.  Id. at 69. 
267 See notes 19, 55, 56 and 65 above and Normative Copyright, n. 54 above at 1307 (July 2003) 
("the economic rationale for copyright services is the central guiding theme for U.S. jurisprudence, which 
both expands and limits copyright"). 
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flaws impair the market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how resources should 
be allocated, is there an economic need for allowing nonconsensual transfer."269 Also 
as discussed above, the most common example of market failure given is where high 
transaction costs in obtaining consent would outweigh the financial benefit in creating 
the derivative work.270 
What if the party wishing to create a derivative work only needs to obtain 
one consent – as is the case of a translation of a single book – and the third party 
knows who the copyright holder is, so the issue would not really be the transaction cost 
of finding the copyright holder?  Is it a "market failure" if the copyright holder wants to 
charge a license fee, and the third party does not wish to pay it?271 
Since a copyright holder can license any part of his work to create a 
derivative work, allowing a person to avoid paying such license fee and create a 
derivative work as a fair use would necessarily have some adverse economic effect on 
the copyright holder (the loss of the license fee).272 Yet the Supreme Court in Sony 
rejected the argument that the parody was not a fair use, even though it could hurt the 
market for the original work, since that did not "produce a harm cognizable under the 
 
268 Economic Analysis, n. 19 above at 326. 
269 Market Failure, n. 65 above at 1615. 
270 Id. at 1627-1630. 
271 Article II of the Appendix to the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty 
provides for compulsory licensing of literary works for developing countries to make translations of those 
works if a number of conditions are met.  10 Nimmer On Copyright, App. 50-24/25 (n. 7 above).  
However, providing such a mechanism for the imposition of fees on developing countries or entities in 
developing countries that cannot afford food for their citizens simply would not seem fair.  In economic 
terms, requiring a license fee to be paid where functioning economic markets would be a "market failure." 
272 "it is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market that if that 
potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at bar …. the plaintiff can always 
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Copyright Act."273 In other words, not all economic "harm" is cognizable under the four 
fair use factors. 
Is not receiving a possible license fee a "harm cognizable under the 
Copyright Act"?  In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,274 plaintiff alleged that the 
copying of articles in medical journals by the National Institute of Health (NIH) to 
distribute to employees of NIH and other research and education oriented institutions 
was copyright infringement.  Looking at the same factors called for by the Copyright Act 
of 1976, the court said "the law gives copying for scientific purposes a wide scope" and 
that the copying was not an "attempt to misappropriate the work of earlier scientific 
writers for forbidden ends, but rather an effort to gain easier access to the material for 
study and research."275 The court said that without such copying, medical researchers 
realistically would not be able to gain access to the articles, since many did not have 
wide circulation, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if such library 
photocopying were stopped."276 Since plaintiff had not proved economic harm from the 
copying, the court concluded the copying at issue was a fair use.277 
allege that she wished to reserve the future right to enter that niche – even to the extent of parodying her 
own work at some future time."  4 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A][4], pp. 13-196-197 (n. 7 above). 
273 510 U.S. at 591-592. 
274 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Claims 1973), aff'd by equally divided Supreme Court without opinion, 420 
U.S. 376 (1975). 
275 487 F.2d at 1354 
276 Id. at 1356 - 1357. 
277 Williams was decided before the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 and is controversial.  
Copies are now made much easier than in the past, and in Williams there was no established licensing 
market for articles from periodicals.  Id. at 1359-1360.  In Williams, moreover, at least many of the authors 
of the specific works did not object to the copying of those articles.  Id. at 1359.  The split vote in the 
Supreme Court in Williams reflects the fact that how to balance access in the fair use "equation" has often 
been disputed.  Even though four Justices voted to affirm the decision of the Court of Claims in Williams,
the Ninth Circuit in Sony referred to the decision in Williams as the "Dred Scott decision of copyright law," 
quoting from the dissent in Williams.  659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1982).  Of course, the Supreme Court 
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Should the copyright holder have the right to require a "reasonable" 
license fee in all cases ?  Gordon said "to propose that fair use be imposed whenever 
the 'social value . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist,' would be to propose 
depriving copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when they encounter 
those users who could afford to pay for it."  Yet the Supreme Court has rejected 
copyright as a natural right.278 Moreover, the statutory copyright scheme establishes 
copyright as a regulatory mechanism in which balance – not property – is the key.279 In 
Sony, the Supreme Court's statement suggested that a copyright holder could only have 
an expectation of a license fee for markets that "creators of original works would in 
general develop or license to others."280 
At least with respect to non-profit uses by third parties, courts should only 
consider evidence of lost licensing revenues with respect to authorized derivative works 
in existing markets at the time of the litigation.281 For instance, Duhl has argued that 
 
reversed the Ninth Circuit in Sony. Moreover, in Triangle Publications, Inc., 626 F.2d at 1177, the Fifth 
Circuit cited Williams favorably a number of times. 
278 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 661, n. 53 above. 
279 n. 67 above and accompanying text. 
280 510 U.S. at 592. 
281 Sony Computer Entertainment American v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000) (In a 
case involving comparative advertising, the Ninth Circuit said "Bleem responds by contending that there is 
no market in screen shots.  Certainly screen shots are a standard device used in industry to demonstrate 
video game graphics, but there is not a market for them, or at least not one in which Bleem may 
participate given Sony's refusal to license it").  In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 
116, n. 6 (2nd Cir. 1998), n. 146 above, the court said that because the plaintiff had "not identified any 
market for a derivative work that might be harmed by the Paramount ad, "the defendant had no obligation 
to affirmatively present evidence of lack of harm in connection with the fourth factor.  Although the court in 
Leibovitz also said that "Lebovitz all but concedes that the Paramount photograph did not interfere with 
any potential market," Id. at 116, the discussion of the evidence involved actual markets, which suggests 
actual products, not theoretical ones.  Although the Supreme Court in Sony referred to "effect upon the 
potential market," the Court there was referring to potential market for the original work.  464 U.S. at 450.  
In other words, there was an existing product.  For a derivative work, there also should be an existing 
product.  Moreover, in Sony, the Court made clear that with respect to a noncommercial use by a third 
party, the copyright holder had a greater burden of proving harm.  Id. at 451.  In Princeton, n. 223 above, 
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"[o]nly when a market for such licensing exists and the copyright holder is able and 
willing to exploit that market should lost royalties be considered in measuring the effects 
of the unlicensed use on the copyright holder's market."282 There should be a provable 
nexus, in other words, between an identified market and existing uses of the type similar 
to the use at issue challenged in the litigation.283 
Two appellate court decisions holding that copying excerpts from larger 
works did not constitute fair use do not lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff’s 
willingness to license a work should preclude fair use.  In American Geophysical Union 
v. Texaco, Inc., the Second Circuit held that copying of articles in scientific and medical 
journals by employees of Texaco – when there was an ongoing market for licensing 
such articles – was not a fair use.284 The court stated "[o]nly an impact on potential 
licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets should 
be legally cognizable when evaluating a secondary use's 'effect upon the potential 
 
99 F.3d at 1387, the court said fair use was appropriate when the copyright holder "simply had no interest 
in occupying" the market.  If the copyright holder has not created, or previously licensed a party to create, 
the translations in question, that is evidence it does not intend to occupy the market.  That evidence 
becomes stronger each year a book is on the market in the United States. 
282 G. Duhl, "Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, And Copycat Comic Books:  The Four Fair Use Factor In 
U.S. Copyright Law," 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 665, 734 (2004).  Duhl suggests that a key issue should be 
whether the allegedly infringing work is a private use or a public use.  He suggests that public uses are 
transformative uses and "non-transformative uses satisfying other governmental objectives, such as 
education and public adjudication."  Id. at 735.  This would support the position that the Kikuyu Key is a 
fair use. 
283 In Williams, the court said "[w]e think it equally outside a court's present competence to turn the 
determination of 'fair use' on the owner's willingness to license to hold that photocopying (without royalty 
payments) is not 'fair use' if the owner is willing to license at reasonable rates but becomes a 'fair use' if 
the owner is adamant and refuses all permission (or seeks to charge excessive fees)."  487 F.2d at 1360.  
See also, Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003)  ("we determine whether the defendants' 
introductions of the manuscript in evidence would materially impair the marketability of the work and 
whether it would act as a market substitute for it" – emphasis added); and Haberman v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 626 F.Supp. 201, 213 (D. Mass. 1986) ("the evidence does not establish that there is a 
reasonable probability of a textbook market for the disputed photographs or that any such market has 
been materially impaired by the alleged use"). 
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market for or value of the copyrighted work.'"285 The court noted that Congress had 
specifically encouraged the particular licensing market and added, "[w]e do not decide 
how the fair use balance would be resolved if a photocopying license for Catalyses 
articles were not currently available.286 
The Sixth Circuit also took into account lost license fees in rejecting a fair 
use defense in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.287 In 
Princeton, a "copy shop" made copies of parts of textbooks that university professors 
wanted to use in their courses, without paying any fees to the publishers of the 
textbooks.  Other copy shops had paid fees to the publishers amounting to $500,000 a 
year.288 Exact copies of the excerpts were made, and there was no evidence the 
students would otherwise not have had access to the works.289 The Sixth Circuit said a 
"licensing market already exists here, as it did not in Williams."  Quoting American 
Geophysical, the court said "a particular unauthorized use should be considered 'more 
fair' when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an 
 
284 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
285 Id. at 930.  The Second Circuit noted that "a copyright holder can always assert some degree of 
adverse effect on its potential licensing revenue as a consequence of the secondary use at issue simply 
because the copyright holder has not been paid a fee to permit that particular use."  Id. at 929, n. 17.  
Texaco involved copying by researchers at Texaco of articles from scientific journals for use in their 
research "without Texaco having to purchase another original journal."  Id. at 919.  The court found it 
important that publishers had "created, primarily through the CCC [Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.], a 
workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies of 
individual articles via photocopying."  Id. at 930. 
286 Id. at 931. 
287 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
288 Id. at 1387. 
289 Id. at 1389 ("This kind of mechanical 'transformation' bears little resemblance to the creative 
metamorphosis accomplished by the parodists in the Campbell case."); and 1389 ("none of these 
affidavits shows that the professor executing the affidavit would have refrained from assigning the 
copyrighted work if the position taken by the copyright holder had been sustained beforehand"). 
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unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a ready market or 
means to pay for it."290 
In neither American Geophysical nor Texaco had an identifiable 
population been unable to gain access to the works in question at the time of the 
litigation in question.291 Also, in American Geophysical and Texaco the challenged uses 
were commercial,292 and there were existing licensing markets for the exact derivative 
works.  Neither case would preclude a finding of fair use for the Kikuyu Key. 
More recently the Eleventh Circuit looked only at the effect of a third 
party’s work on derivative works existing at the time of the litigation in Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., a case involving a claim that the book "The Wind Done Gone" 
(TWDG) infringed the copyright of "Gone With The Wind." (GWTW)293 The author of 
TWDG had "appropriated the characters, plot and major scenes from GWTW into the 
first half of TWDG" in order to create "a critique of GWTW's depiction of slavery and the 
 
290 99 F.3d at 1387, quoting from 60 F.3d at 931. 
291 The recent decision in Perfect 10, discussed above at n. 169, considered an authorized derivative 
work in existence at the time of the decision, but not at the filing of the suit.  As mentioned in n. 169, this 
is an unduly restrictive reading of fair use.  See Reclaiming Copyright, n. 253 above at p. 598 ("The 
copyright owner could always argue that she has suffered some market harm because the defendant 
could have paid a fee for the very use at issue in the case.  This argument is circular, however, because if 
the defendant's use is a fair use, then the copyright owner had no right to compensation from the 
defendant in the first place and there would be no harm to a legally recognized market"). 
292 Cf. Allen v. Academic Games League of America, Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996) (§107 
"allows the fair use of a copyrighted work in such instances as for nonprofit educational purposes and 
where the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the protected work is limited….  
AGLOA tournaments are held not for profit, but for encouraging education among young students"). 
293 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-1275 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Several derivative works of GWTW have been 
authorized, including the famous movie of the same name and a book titled Scarlett:  The Sequel ….  
Suntrust has negotiated an agreement with St. Martin's Press permitting it to produce another derivative 
work ….  [Suntrust] fails to address and offers little evidence or argument to demonstrate that TWDG 
would supplant demand for Suntrust's licensed derivatives.") (Emphasis added). 
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Civil-War era American South."294 Although recognizing that the fourth fair use factor 
considered adverse economic effect on the original work and on derivative works, the 
court added that the "only harm to derivatives that need concern us is the harm of 
market substitution."295 The court only considered existing licensed derivatives, not 
potential licensed derivative works.  The Eleventh Circuit said that plaintiff Suntrust "fails 
to address and offers little evidence or argument to demonstrate that TWDG would 
[substitute] demand for Suntrust's licensed derivatives."296 The court held it was 
unlikely plaintiff would prevail against defendant's fair use defense and vacated the 
preliminary injunction issued by the district court.297 
Lost licensing income can be an issue, in other words, when there is an 
existing market.  However, there is no authority for the proposition that a copyright 
holder causes a non-profit entity’s derivative work to be an infringing work simply by 
saying the copyright holder would not have objected to the creation of the derivative 
work if the third party had paid a license fee.  This lack of authority requiring such 
license payments is consistent with the need, discussed next, to create translations for 
underserved populations without requiring payment of a license fee. 
 
294 Id. at 1259. 
295 Id. at 1274, quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.  
296 Id. at 1275. 
297 The court concluded by saying "the issuance of the injunction was at odds with the shared 
principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior restraint on speech because 
the public had not had access to Randall's ideas or viewpoint in the form of expression that she chose."  
Id. at 1277.  The court separately suggested that even without the fair use defense, damages would be 
more appropriate than an injunction, in light of the speech issues involved. 
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D. Underserved Populations Throughout the World Need Meaningful 
Access to Literary Works 
Congress recognized the need visually impaired individuals had to 
meaningful access to literary works by limiting the legal ability of copyright holders to 
prevent translations of literary works into Braille.298 Division (a) of §121 provides that "it 
is not an infringement of copyright for an authorized entity to reproduce or to distribute 
copies or phonorecords of a previously published, nondramatic literary work if such 
copies or phonorecords are reproduced or distributed in specialized formats exclusively 
for use by blind or other persons with disabilities."  Division (d) defines "authorized 
entity" to mean "a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary 
mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive 
reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities."  
President Clinton applauded the legislation upon signing it and said books could now be 
converted into formats such as Braille as soon as they appeared in print.299 
Just as there is a great need to provide visually impaired individuals in this 
country with access to literary works by allowing third parties to copy existing books into 
Braille without paying a license fee, the need for more meaningful access to literary 
 
298 17 U.S.C. §121.  PL 104-197, Title III, §316 
299 September 16, 1996 Statement Upon Signing H.R. 3745, the Legislative Branch Appropriations 
Act, 1997.  5 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 104th Congress, Second Session, 1996, 
p. 2904-2.  Previously, §710 of the Copyright Act had authorized the Library of Congress to establish 
forms and procedures to permit copyright owners to voluntarily grant the Library of Congress a license to 
produce copyrighted works in the form of Braille or as books on tape to be distributed solely to visually 
impaired persons.  Section 710 was repealed by PL 106-379 in 2000, because §710 had become 
"redundant."  See House Report 106-861 to accompany H.R. 5107, 4 U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, 104th Congress, Second Session, p. 1378. 
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works in the developing countries is also crucial.300 The 2003 Declaration of Principles 
of the World Summit on the Information Society said "the benefits of the information 
technology revolution are today unevenly distributed between the developed and 
developing countries and within societies."301 Trying to reduce the gap between rich 
and poor must include trying to increase "access to relevant programming, stories and 
reports….  Especially critical here is access to materials in the user's own language, 
whether Swahili or Tamil."302 One element of the Plan of Action of the World Summit on 
the Information Society is, "Through public/private partnerships, [to] foster the creation 
of varied local and national content, including that available in the language of users . . 
."303 This great need for increased access supports a finding of fair use for the Kikuyu 
Key. 
E. Kikuyu Key Summary 
Under the Kikuyu Key concept, a nonprofit corporation would provide the 
translations for educational purposes to school districts or governmental entities in 
developing countries that would otherwise not be able to pay for them.  In contrast to 
American Geophysical and Princeton, the persons translating the works (or creating the 
software to translate the works) would not simply copy the works, but would put creative 
 
300 M. Chon.  "Intellectual Property And The Development Divide," 27 Cardozo L. Review 2821, 2894 
(April 2006) (hereafter "Chon")  ("Education is fundamental to the capacity-building upon which all further 
progress is made.  Although copyright is only one of many factors that go into the provision of basic 
education it is an essential policy lever for educational development generally"). 
301 ¶ 10, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html, visited 6/1/2006.  
302 Information Revolution, n. 4 above at p. 302.  In Information Revolution, Wilson added, "The 
potential user in a developing country will find all these other forms of access [such as cognitive, financial 
and physical access] quite hollow if when she goes to the Web, the Internet, or the television, she finds 
nothing available to her in her language. . . ."  Id. 
303 ¶ 2g – see http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/pou.html, visited 6/1/2006.   
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effort into determining how the works would best translate into Kikuyu (or languages of 
other citizens of developing countries).304 Translating into Kikuyu a math book written in 
English, or a web page written in English, would create a derivative work of the book or 
web page.  However, publishers should not be able to prevent persons acting on a 
nonprofit basis from translating English works into the languages of citizens of 
developing countries, citizens who would not otherwise be able to meaningfully access 
such works. 
Unlike the sale of books originally written in English in this country, where 
a significant consideration presumably was the prospect of profit from the sales of 
books, the purpose in translations would not be profit, but education, a transformative 
purpose.305 Moreover, unlike citizens in this country who have access to free public 
libraries and free public education, citizens in developing countries do not have access 
to such books or knowledge.  This distinguishes the Kikuyu Key from Nihon and Radji 
and means that a court should find the Kikuyu Key to be a fair use:306 
Kikuyu Key 
1.  Character and purpose 
of allegedly infringing use 
a.  Non-commercial—favors Kikuyu Key. 
b.  Translations one of the express rights authors 
have, but purpose is different than purpose of 
304 Cf. Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, 312 F.3d 94, 97 (2nd Cir. 2002) (“We 
reject Otsar’s assertion that the translation [of a Hebrew prayerbook in the public domain into English] is 
not copyrightable ….  The translation process requires exercise of careful literary and scholarly 
judgment”). 
305 Arguably textbooks in the United States would have the same purpose as textbooks in Kenya, but 
there is an established market and ability to pay for them, perhaps in contrast to Kenya.  Also, to the 
extent textbooks are involved, the "law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works 
than works of fiction or fantasy."  Harper, 471 U.S. at 563; and Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 
F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting Harper.
306 Chon, n. 298 above at p. 2900 ("there is a lot of 'room for manoevre' [sic] both for intellectual 
property protection in the form of copyright, on the one hand, and for limitations and exceptions to 
copyright in order to access knowledge goods for essential education, on the other"). 
87 
 
©2006 Douglas L. Rogers 
 
Kikuyu Key 
publishers in U.S., to make a profit rather than simply 
to educate—favors Kikuyu Key. 
2.  Nature of copyrighted 
work 
Favors copyright holders, but only slightly, because 
copying is necessary to fit the transformative purpose. 
3.  Amount and 
substantiality of portion of 
copyrighted work copied 
Favors copyright holders, but only slightly, because 
copying is what is necessary for the transformative 
purpose. 
4.  Effect on markets for 
copyrighted work and 
derivatives 
No realistic possibility that for-profit publishers would 
translate works into Kikuyu,  and publishers will not be 
harmed.  Favors Kikuyu Key. 
5. Increasing access to 
literary works/knowledge 
Favors Kikuyu Key. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Put simply, courts must consider fair use in the context of the real world, 
and the statutory fair use factors are only tools to arrive at fair results.307 Under 
copyright authority and theory, the "public is entitled to expect access to the works that 
copyright inspires."308 Indeed, "it is central to our democratic processes that we secure 
'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources.'"309 Yet the law controls more content for copyright holders than ever in our 
past.310 
While citizens of developed countries may be able to adjust to the 
increased control of content, the situation is more dire in developing countries and the 
 
307 See L. L. Weinreb, "Fair's Fair:  A Comment On The Fair Use Doctrine", 103 Harvard L. Rev. 
1137, 1152 (March 1990) ("Fairness is a particularly open concept, on which almost any of the facts in a 
concrete may have a bearing….  The statutory factors … are central to the question of fair use.  But 
copyright is itself set in a social context, and more general considerations of fairness may come into 
play"). 
308 J. Litman, Digital Copyright, Prometheus Books (2001), p. 175. 
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stakes higher.311 In spite of "the important scientific and technological advances and 
promises of the 20th and early 21st centuries, in many areas a significant 'knowledge 
gap' as well as a 'digital divide' continue to separate the wealthy nations from the 
poor."312 Moreover, "higher standards of intellectual property protection have failed to 
foster the transfer of technology through foreign direct investment [in] and licensing" to 
developing countries.313 
The direction of the law discussed in this article is consistent with basic 
notions of fairness.  How can it be fair to deny people in the United States and 
throughout the world access to a digital database that none of the separate copyright 
holders could create and that identifies by key words books addressing certain subjects 
and the location of those books?314 That cannot be fair.   
The First Amendment aspects of fair use discussed above in part IVA are 
also consistent with the morality of helping spread knowledge to developing 
 
309 Y. Benkler, "Free As The Air To Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints On Enclosure Of 
The Public Domain," 74 N.Y. U.L. Rev. 354, 358 (May 1999), quoting Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and citing other Supreme Court decisions. 
310 L. Lesseg, The Future Of Ideas, Random House, (2001), p. 110. 
311 Anatole France said, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep 
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."  The Red Lily, 1894, chapter 7;
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Anatole_France/, visited 8/12/06.  Of course, his point was the 
rich did not have to sleep under bridges, so as a practical matter, the law treated the rich and poor 
unequally.  Similarly. the majority of individuals living in developed countries have the resources to 
overcome the burdens imposed by higher copyright protection of works. 
312 World Intellectual Property Organization General Assembly – Proposal By Argentina And Brazil 
For The Establishment Of A Development Agenda For WIPO (WIPO Proposal"), p. 1 of Annex, 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/doc/wo_ga_31_11.doc.
313 Id. at p. 3 of Annex. 
314 Chon, at n. 298 above, p. 2912 ("If the instrumental mandate of intellectual property law is truly to 
increase knowledge for positive purposes, then there must be fuller consideration of the provision of basic 
needs and other global public goods such as food, security, education and health care.  Undernourished, 
diseased, dying, undereducated, or extremely impoverished populations are viewed by many as negative 
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countries.315 How can it be fair for the United States to say democracy should spread 
but deny developing countries access to translations of the great literary works that are 
a foundation of our democracy?  That cannot be fair.  
In perhaps his most famous speech, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said "we 
will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty 
stream."316 Similarly, non-profit organizations should not be satisfied to ask the 
copyright holders for permission to create translations for the citizens of developing 
countries. 317 Such non-profit entities should be able to use fair use to help education 
roll down like water to those who most need it, citizens of developing countries. 
One can construct any technical fair use test he wants to, but it would 
simply not be fair to deny individuals access to the Google Database or to prevent 
individuals from voluntarily, and without charge, translating works identified in the 
Google Database into languages of the citizens of developing countries.  Those citizens 
could then for the first time have meaningful access to knowledge and a chance to 
escape from poverty.  Let it be that the prospect of increasing access to literary works 
makes fair use a bridge over the troubled waters of despair and poverty to hope and 
prosperity.318 
315 See §IV.A. above.  Of course, some publishers may allow third parties to translate certain works 
into the native languages of citizens of developing countries without paying a license fee, and that would 
be wonderful.  However, it is more likely that publishers would grant such consent if they knew they had 
no choice. 
316 "I Have A Dream," August 28, 1963.  http://www.usconstitution.net/dream.html, visited 8/12/06. 
317 Describing his experiences with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Bishop 
Desmond Tutu said "You can kiss reconciliation and forgiveness goodbye, unless the gap between the 
rich and poor—the haves and have-nots—is narrowed, and narrowed quickly and dramatically."   
318 The Beatles sang "And when the broken hearted people Living in the world agree, There will be 
an answer, let it be." http://www.allspirit.co.uk/let.html, visited 8/12/06.  Simon and Garfunkel sang "When 
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you're down and out, When you're on the street, … And pains is all around, Like a bridge over troubled 
water, I will lay me down."  http://freespace.virgin.net/r.kent/lyrics/bridge.over.troubled.water, visited 
8/12/06. 
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